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Abstract
A Collective Identity Function (CIF) is a rule which aggregates personal opinions
on whether an individual belongs to a certain identity into a social decision. A CIF is
qualied as elementarywhenever it can be expressed in terms of winning coalitions.
Elementary CIFs can be characterized with independence axiom. We then investigate
the e¤ect of imposing new axioms on the structure of winning coalitions. We further
characterize the class of simple CIFs in terms of three axioms, namely independence,
monotonicity and self-duality. We also explore the e¤ect of imposing conditions that
ensure the equal treatment of individuals as voters or as outcomes. We show that
liberalism arises as the unique simple CIF that satises axioms which are very natural
in the collective identity determination context.
Keywords: Collective identity function, Winnign coalitions, Liberalism.
Özetçe
Toplumsal Kimlik Fonksiyonu (TKF), her bireyin belirli bir kimli¼ge ait olup ol-
mad¬¼g¬hakk¬ndaki ki¸sisel görüs¸lerini toplumsal bir görüs¸e dönüs¸türen bir kurald¬r.
Kazanan koalisyonlar cinsinden ifade edilebilen TKFler "temel" olarak nitelendirilmi¸stir.
Temel TKFler ba¼g¬ms¬zl¬k (independence) aksiyomu ile karakterize edilebilirler. Daha
sonra yeni aksiyomlar¬n eklenmesinin kazanan koalisyonlar¬n yap¬lar¬üzerine etkisi in-
celenmi¸stir. Ayn¬zamanda "sade" TKFler grubu ba¼g¬ms¬zl¬k, monotonluk ve kendil-
i¼ginden ikilik (self-duality) axiomlar¬yla karakterize edilmi¸stir. Ayr¬ca, oy verenler
veya oy verilenler olarak bireylerin es¸it muamele görmelerini temin eden s¸artlar¬n
eklenmesinin etkileri incelenmi¸stir. Liberalizmin sade TKFler içerisinde toplumsal
kimlik belirleme ba¼glam¬nda çok do¼gal olan aksiyonlar¬ sa¼glayan tek kural oldu¼gu
gösterilmi¸stir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Toplumsal kimlik fonksiyonu, Kazanan koalisyonlar, Liberal-
izm.
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1 Introduction
Each individual has an identity in his social life. These identities may vary such as
being a member of a club, member of a family, citizen of a country, supporter of a
political party, believer of a religion and this list can be expanded. Each person has an
opinion (idea, belief) about whether he is a member of an identity or not. It is possible
that ones opinion about himself and the social perception (which can be expressed
as social opinion or collective identity) about that individual may di¤er. Hence a
question how can we determine an individuals social identity naturally arises and this
is the question that we deal with in this work i.e. nding a method of determining
identities. Of course when answering this question, the name of identity matters.
It can be argued that some identities have some set of strict rules to di¤erentiate
whether one carry the identity or not. For example, being a member of a university
as a student or as a sta¤can be an example of such identities. You can look the register
of the university and nd all who are members of a university.1 As an other example,
consider a club for solidarity of families with children in a specic neighbourhood.
One may search a set of rules to separate the members and non-members. The
following rule can be applied to determine who are the ones eligible to be a member
of the club: the prospective families are welcomed to club if they reside in the given
neighbourhood and have at least one child, otherwise they are not allowed to join the
club.
However, not all identities fall in this category and the question "who are the
members" can not be resolved by applying a strict rule. For example, consider that
a group of individuals has to determine a set of representatives who sign a contract
or an aggrement that impose a responsibility to all members of the group. In such a
case, assuming each individual has an opinion about all individuals (including himself)
whether one can be a delegate or not is not so unrealistic. Hence it can be proposed
that personal opinions can be aggregated to nd a social opinion. Thus ones social
decision may depend on all individuals decision about him and there are various ways
of aggregating this individual opinions into a social opinion.
Though there may be other suggestions for identity determination problem as well
as there may be proponents of the rst way stated above, in this study we follow the
latter approach and treat the identity determination as an aggregation problem from
1Of course we exclude the situations like "As far as, I am legally a student of the University of
..., but I do not feel myself as a student"
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individuals opinions to social opinions since aggregation is a commonly discussed and
analyzed topic in economics and social choice theory. Moreover, we should say this
is not the rst attempt known in the literature. The rst attempt to analyze the
collective identity determination problem through concepts of social choice theory is
made by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) who, based on an exploration of Kasher (1993)
about the Jewish identity, propose a method of aggregating personal opinions into
social opinion of the identity: Who are the Jews?. Kasher and Rubinstein consider a
society and some abstract concept of identity (such as being a J) to which every
member of the society may or may not belong. Each individual has a personal opinion
about whom does and whom does not belong to this identity. The collective decision is
made by the aggregation of individual opinions - hence the introduction of a collective
identity function (CIF), which maps individual opinions into a social opinion. The
model, while mathematically simple, incorporates a plethora of concepts related to
collective identity determination. So, leaving the modesty of its founders aside,2 it
paved the way to a growing literature, the pivots of which will be mentioned in the
Section 3 as a start for our analysis. Before summarizing previous results, we present
the formal model in Section 2.
Among various aggregation functions that can be dened, the liberal rule appears
as a central concept. Under the liberal CIF, an individual is socially conceived as
belonging to some identity J if and only if he believes to carry identity J-or to be
a J, so to speak. A rst axiomatic characterization of liberalism is given by Kasher
and Rubinstein (1997).3 Another strand of the literature views CIFs as a recursive
procedure which is also proposed by Kasher (1993). For example, the procedural
CIF of Kasher (1993) suggests to determine an initial set J(0) of individuals who
are unanimously agreed to carry identity J . All individuals who are considered to
be a J by at least one member of J(0) are added to J(0), hence expanding the set
of Js to J(1). The procedure continues inductively until the set of Js cannot be
expanded anymore. A variant of this procedure, where the initial set J(0) consists
of individuals who consider themselves as Js, is dened by Dimitrov, Sung, and Xu
(2004) who characterize both procedures.4 More recently, Samet and Schmeidler
2Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) present it as a purely logical exercise
3while Dimitrov and Sung (2003) show that the ve axioms used by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997)
are logically dependent whereas three of them su¢ ce to establish the desired equivalence. See Section
3.1.
4See section 3.2.
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(2003) axiomatically characterize a class of CIFs which they call consent rules.5 This
class is parametrized by the weights given to individuals in determining their own
identity. It contains liberalism at one extreme and majoritarianism6 at the other.
As we discuss in the section 4, the procedural view of CIFs is almost orthogonal to
Samet and Schmeidlers conception of consent rules which lie between liberalism and
majoritarianism. We devote the section 3 to the results obtained by authors given
above.
We propose to approach the collective identity determination problem from a per-
spective where CIFs can be expressed in terms of winning coalitions.7 In section 4.1,
we start by observing under previously used condition of independence which states
that ones social decision depends peoples opinion only about that individual, we can
express the behavior of CIF in terms of winning coalitions. We qualify such CIFs
as elementary. Under an elementary CIF, the information about the social opinion
contained in the set of winning coalitions is the same as that in the corresponding
aggregation rule. In other words, elementary CIFs can be examined through their
winning coalitions, which brings us a new perspective in the exploration of the col-
lective identity determination problem. Then we investigate the structure of winning
coalitions as we introduce new conditions. We add a monotonicity condition stating
additional opinions about an individual which are same with social opinion about that
individual can not change social opinion of the individual. Then we call independent
and monotonic rules as basic CIFs. We then introduce blocking coalition, a coalition
that can determine an individuals social opinion as non-member by disqualifying him
on the contrary of others qualication. We then investigate the whether a coalition
can be winning and/or blocking through three version of self duality axioms. Finally,
we characterize simple CIFs8 in terms of independence, monotonicity and self-duality.
One can refer Taylor and Zwicker (1999) for details of winning-blocking coalitions and
simple games since we follow their terminology in this work. We devote section 4.2 to
equal treatment properties for voters and alternatives and o¤er an alternative charac-
terization for liberal rule in section 4.3. Then we compare our ndings with previous
5See section 3.3.
6Where, as also exemplied by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997), personal opinions about the identity
of an individual are aggregated according to the majority rule.
7As usual, we say that a coalition K of individuals is winning for individual i if and only if the
members of K, on the contrary of the opinions of the rest of the society, are able to determine
whether i carries identity J .
8A detailed discussion of simple social choice rules in a general social choice setting can be found
in Austen-Smith and Banks (1999) in addition to Taylor and Zwicker (1999).
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results. We nally give conslusion in section 5.
4
2 Model
We consider a society represented with N = f1; :::; ng which is a nite set of individ-
uals with n  2. The society is confronted to the problem of deciding on its members
who belong to some groupor who carry a certain given identity. For each i 2 N , we
write Gi  N for the set of individuals whom i perceives as a member of the group.
We refer to Gi as the opinion of i. j 2 Gi is interpreted as individual i believes that
individual j carry the identity or in other words individual j is qualied by individual
i. Thus for individual i, the set Gi represents the set of individuals that i believes
they carry the identity. An opinion prole is an n-tuple G = (G1; :::; Gn) 2   where
  = (2N )n is the set of all proles. It is sometimes referred simply as "prole" in
the remaining of this study. A Collective Identity Function (CIF) is a mapping F :  
! 2N that assigns a subset of individuals to each prole. For any prole, we call
F (G) as social opinion which is also a subset of society. i 2 F (G) is interpreted as
individual i is socially qualied as a member of identity. Let F represents the set of
all CIFs.
For any prole G 2  , we dene G 2   as Gi = N n Gi for all i 2 N . In same
manner, for any social opinion F (G), we write F (G) as the complement of F (G)
i.e. F (G) = N n F (G). If G 2   is the collection of personal opinions that reects
members of an identity, G 2   dened as above can be interpreted as the opinions
where each individual express non-members as his opinion.
For each personal opinion of j, Gj ji represents the opinion of j only about i. So
we write Gj ji = ? if i =2 Gj and Gj ji = fig if i 2 Gj . Therefore, for any prole
G 2   and any i 2 N , the opinions restricted to individual i is represented by G ji
which is an element of n-tuple (?; fig)n, that is G ji 2 (?; fig)n. In same manner,
F (G) ji represents the social opinion of individual i and can be either ? or fig, that
is F (G) ji 2 f?; figg. With the help of restricting opinions to individuals, we can
write for any G;H 2  , G ji = H ji if and only if i 2 Gj () i 2 Hj for all j 2 N ,
that is all people in society has the same personal opinion about i in the proles G;H
while they may possibly di¤er in opinions about individuals other than i.
Given a bijection  : N ! N , we write, by a slight abuse of notation, (K) =
f(j) : j 2 Kg for any non-empty K  N . By a more considerable abuse of notation,
for any G 2  , we mean by (G) a new prole H such that H(j) = (Gj) for
each j 2 N . The bijection can be interpreted as changing the names of individuals.
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For example, (i) can be interpreted as the new name of individual whose old name
is i. Applying the permutation  to a set of individuals give the new names of all
in the set whereas applying  to a prole (G) gives a new prole (H) where each
individual (j) expresses his opinions with his new name ((j)) as the set of new
names of individuals (H(j) = (Gj)) he previously qualies (Gj). In other words,
under old names if i qualies j, then (i) qualies (j) under new names.
Whereas the problem is treated as an aggregation problem, our model di¤ers from
other well-known aggregation models such as Arrows Social Welfare Functions. We
will charactare a class of Collective Identity Functions which we call them "simple"
including the liberal rule as well as majoritarion rule. Both rules are discussed in the
literature in di¤erent contexts. For example, May (1952) characterizes simple major-
ity rule where a nite set of individuals confronts two alternatives, usually interpreted
as yes/no voting.9 Later on, Arrow (1951) introduces a social welfare function (SWF)
which aggregates individuals preferences into a transitive and complete social pref-
erences. In Arrows model, there are nite number of alternatives which has at least
three cardinality, hence an expansion of Mays model and a nite number of individ-
uals express their preferences over alternatives. In his pioneering work, he showed
the impossibility of nding a non-dictatorial aggregation rule which satises Pareto
optimality and independence of irrelevant alternatives under full domain10 and transi-
tive social outcomes. Sen (1970) extends Arrows result into impossibility of Paretian
Liberal Social Welfare Functions satisfying the liberal principle introduced by Sen.
He calls an individual decisive on two alternatives if the function orders these two
alternatives in the same way the individual orders regardless of otherspreferences
over these two alternatives. Sens minimal liberalism axiom states that there is at
least two decisive individuals over two alternatives. He shows, then, that this axiom
contradicts Pareto optimality, referring this contradiction as the liberal paradox.
Not only our characterization includes liberal rule, but also we are able to o¤er
alternative characterizations of liberal rule at the end of each section of previous
works mentioned in the next section. The possibilty of liberal rule in our model may
be because of the di¤erences of our model and previous models in social choice theory
some of which are mentioned above. Note that in our model, the liberal is not only
possible, rather it satises most of mild axioms and can be characterized in many
9Note individuals are allowed to be indi¤erent between alternatives.
10Which means that individuals are not prohibited to express any preferences provided that it is
complete and transitive.
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di¤erent ways. We now list main di¤erences of our model from previous models.
 Social alternatives in previous models such as Arrows has no special meaning.
They are any set of abstract alternatives such as bundles of goods, political
parties, political/social issues that a society confronts and so on. Because the
alternatives does not carrry any given characteristics, one need to exogenously
assign some alternatives to an individual to be decisive over. But in our model,
the alternatives are the members of society, hence they carry a very certain
characteristic and we are able to endegenously allow an individual is decisive
over the social decision about himself.
 Social welfare functions in previous models gives a social preference from indi-
vidual preferences rather than choosing a socially acceptable alternative. Our
aggregation function CIF gives a subset of individuals that can be interpreted
as the choice of society hence it is closer to social choice functions rather than
social welfare functions. Though, it is still possible to think individual opin-
ions as dichotomous preferences like preference in May (1952) but indi¤erences
are not allowed in contrast Mays model and the aggregation function as social
welfare function where outcome is restricted to strict dichotomous preference.
 In almost all previous models the set of alternatives and the set of society are
di¤erent set. Although, there are models at which a set of individuals is faced
with the problem of choosing members from another distinct set of individuals.
One can see Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev (2001). But in our model, the
individuals have to decide over themselves hence there are no two distinct sets;
one of which choose from other. As another example, matching problems have
two distinct sets of individuals (such as men and women, workers and rms)
who have complete and transitive preferences over the members of other set.
But in our model, the preferences are restricted to dichotomous preferences
and there are no two separate gruops of individuals. This coincidence of sets
of alternatives and society will also cause di¢ culties when one try to dene
equal-treatment conditions among voters and alternatives. In classical social
choice theory, there two well-known axioms; anonimity and neutraliy where
rst requires equal-treatment among voters and the latter stands for equal-
treatment of alternatives. For example, Samet and Schmeidler (2003) o¤ers an
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axiom, symmetricity which incorporates both anonymity and neutrality. One
of main attempts of this study is try to resolve this distinction.
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3 Previous Works and O¤ered Alternative Charac-
terizations
In this section, we summarize some of previous results in the literature. These are
Kasher and Rubinstein (1997), Dimitrov, Sung, and Xu (2004) and Samet and Schmei-
dler (2003). Details of proofs are moved to appendix.
3.1 On the Question of "Who is a J?"
The rst formal treatment of identity determination problem in the literature was
made by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) with the title "On the question of "who is a
J?"". The title is originated from the previous work of Kasher (1993) who wrote on
Jewish identity and propose a procedure to determine Js from individual opinions.11
Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) formally characterize three di¤erent type of collective
identity functions: the liberal CIF dened as "a J is whoever denes oneself to be J",
the dictatorial CIF where ones social opinion depends only on the dictators opinion
about that individual and nally oligarchic CIF where the power of determining social
opinion about any individuals is held by some groups of individuals which is called
oligarchy. The details of rst characterization will be presented whereas the latter
two will be omitted since their characterization based on equivalence relation that is
developed in Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986) and expressed as a corollaries of results
of Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986).
Before giving details of characterization of the liberal collective identity function,
we rst give the formal denition.
Denition 3.1 The Liberal CIF L 2 F is dened for each G 2   as L(G) = fi 2
N : i 2 Gig
For each possible proles, the liberal CIF gives the set of individuals who qualies
themselves. The social qualication of an individual depends on only his opinion
about himself. Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) formally characterize liberal CIF L with
ve axioms: Consensus, symmetricity, monotonicity, independence and the liberal
principle. They claimed that these axioms are logically independent but Dimitrov
and Sung (2003) showed that the axioms are logically dependent and the liberal CIF
can be characterized by only three axioms; namely symmetricity, independence and
11Dimitrov, Sung, and Xu (2004) characterize this class of CIFs. See Section 3.2.
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the liberal principle. As a result, the denitions of all axioms will be given but the
proofs are followed from Dimitrov and Sung (2003) and presented in the appendix.
Axiom 3.1 A CIF F 2 F satises consensus (C) if i 2 Gj for all j 2 N , then
i 2 F (G) and if i =2 Gj for all j 2 N , then i =2 F (G).
Consensus axioms states that unanimity on an individual in the personal opinions
must result same social opinion with personal opinions. In other words, if a person
is qualied by all members of society, then he must be socially qualied and if all
members of society believe that the person does not carry the identity, then that
person must be socially unqualied.
Axiom 3.2 A CIF F 2 F satises symmetricity (SYM-KR)12 if for any i; j 2 N
and for any prole G 2   satisfying the following conditions
 Gi n fi; jg = Gj n fi; jg
 i 2 Gk () j 2 Gk for all k 2 N n fi; jg,
 j 2 Gi () i 2 Gj
 i 2 Gi () j 2 Gj
we have i 2 F (G) () j 2 F (G).
We say individuals i and j are symmetric in a prole if it satises all four conditions
above for that two individuals. Symmetricity axiom requires the aggregation rule
does not discriminates the individuals who are symmetric in a prole. So for any
two individual in a prole, if they agree on all other individuals in their opinions, all
other individuals have same opinions about these two individuals, one qualies other
if and only if the other qualies the one and nally both have same opinions about
themselves, then symmetricity requires that the rule must give same social opinions
about these two individuals.
Axiom 3.3 A CIF F 2 F satises monotonicity (MON-KR) if for any two proles
G;H 2   such that for all j 2 N n fkg, Gj = Hj and Gk = Hk [ fig, then i 2 F (H)
implies i 2 F (G).
12For further references, some axioms are abbreviated by adding some letters at the end to di¤er-
entiate them from the axioms dened by other authors with same names. For example, KR stands
for Kasher and Rubinstein. But throughout this section, we omit the abbreviations.
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Monotonicity states that if an individual i is social qualied in a prole, then a
change in some individuals opinion in favour of i being a member of identity can not
result disqualication of that individuals.
Axiom 3.4 A CIF F 2 F satises independence (I-KR) if for any individual i 2
N and for any two proles G;H 2   such that Gj ji = Hj ji for all j 2 N and
F (G) n fig = F (H) n fig, then F (G) ji () F (H) ji .
If all individuals (including i) have same opinions about individual i at any two
proles where the social opinion is same except the individuals i, independence states
that the social opinion about i must also be same for these two proles.
Axiom 3.5 A CIF F 2 F satises the liberal principle (L) if for any G 2  , there is
an individual i 2 N with i 2 Gi implies F (G) 6= ? and there is an individual i 2 N
with i =2 Gi implies F (G) 6= N .
The liberal principle states that if there is an individual qualifying himself in a
prole, then the outcome can not be empty set and analogously if there is an individual
who does not qualify himself, then the social opinion can not be whole society. An
equivalent statement of the liberal principle is that, if social opinion is empty set,
then each individual believes that he does not carry the identity, and if social opinion
is whole society, then each individual qualies himself.
Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) states that a CIF satises C, SYM, MON, I and
L if and only if it is liberal CIF and these ve axioms are logically independent.
However, as we noted earlier, Dimitrov and Sung (2003) showed that these axioms
are logically dependent and proved that SYM, I and L are enough to characterize the
liberal CIF. Kasher and Rubinstein give ve examples of CIF for logical independence,
each satises all but one axioms. Dimitrov and Sung showed that the examples for
consensus and monotonicity listed below also fail to satisfy some other axioms and
can not be repaired.
Example 3.1 (C) Let n be odd. The CIF F 2 F dened for all G 2   as F (G) =
L (G) if # fi 2 N : i 2 Gig is odd and F (G) = fi 2 N : i =2 Gig otherwise.
This example fails to satisfy not only consensus also the liberal principle. To see
this, consider n = 3 and the prole Gi = ? for all i 2 f1; 2; 3g. As # fi 2 N : i 2 Gig
is 0 which is even, the rule gives F (G) = N which contradicts with the liberal
11
principle since there is a prole with an individual who does not qualify himself, but
social opinion is whole society.
Example 3.2 (MON) The CIF F 2 F dened for all G 2   as F (G) = fi 2 N :
Gi = figg.
This CIF fails to satisfy C, L and I. To see why F violates C and L, consider
the society with three individuals, N = f1; 2; 3g and the prole Gi = f1; 2g for all
i 2 f1; 2; 3g. The rule gives the social opinion F (G) = ?, violating consensus as
there is a consensus among the members f1; 2g and violates L, since there is a prole
at which the social opinion is empty set whereas there is an individual who qualify
himself, namely individuals 1 or 2. Moreover, to see how the rule violates I, consider
the prole H 2   where H1 = f1g and Hi = f1; 2g for i 2 f2; 3g. The social opinion
for H 2   is F (H) = f1g. Note that we have Gj j1 = f1g = Hj j1 for all j 2 N
and the social opinion about all individuals except 1 is same for two proles, but
1 2 F (H) whereas 1 =2 F (G) violates the independence.
In fact C and MON is implied from other three axioms. We now stated that
SYM, I and L implies C after the following lemma which sates if all individuals have
a consensus among members of a coalition K as being members and among all other
individuals as non-members, then the social outcome must be exactly that coalition,
K.
Lemma 3.1 If a CIF F 2 F satises SYM, I and L, then F  GK = K for all
K  N where GK 2   is the prole such that Gi = K for all i 2 N .
Theorem 3.1 If a CIF F 2 F satises SYM, I and L, then it also satises C.
Before showing the liberal CIF is the only CIF that satises SYM, I and L, we
need to state partition lemma of Dimitrov and Sung (2003). Let P = (P1; P2; P3; P4)
is any 4-partition of N and let GP ;HP 2   are two proles dened for any 4-partition
and for all j 2 N as follows:
GPj =
8<: P1 [ P2P1 [ P2 [ P3
if j 2 P1 [ P3,
if j 2 P2 [ P4.
and
HPj =
8<: P1P1 [ P2
if j 2 P1 [ P3,
if j 2 P2 [ P4,
.
Note that the liberal CIF L gives the same social opinion P1 [P2 for both proles
GP ;HP 2  . The following lemma states any CIF satisfying SYM, I and L also gives
social opinion P1 [ P2 as liberal CIF does.
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Lemma 3.2 If a CIF F 2 F satises SYM, I and L, then F  GP  = F  HP  =
P1 [ P2 for every 4-partition P = (P1; P2; P3; P4) of N .
Note that partition lemma of Dimitrov and Sung (2003) can be viewed as an
extension of lemma 3.1 since for particular 4-partition P = (K;?;?; N nK) of N ,
we have GK = GP = HP .
Finally we can state the characterization theorem of liberal CIF in terms of the
axioms; symmetricity, independence and the liberal principle.13
Theorem 3.2 The Liberal CIF L 2 F is the only CIF that satises SYM, I and L.
Note that as a corollary of theorem 3.2, SYM, I and L implies MON since the
only CIF which satises three axioms is the liberal CIF and it satises monotonicity
condition proposed by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997). This observation is stated in
the following corollary.
Corallary 3.1 Any CIF F 2 F satisfying SYM, I and L also satises MON.
However these three axioms are logically independent. To see this, one can check
the following three examples each of which fails to satises only one axiom. Which
axiom the examples fails is demonstrated with the abbreviation of axioms at the
beginning of each example.
Example 3.3 (SYM) The CIF F 2 F dened for each G 2   as: F (G) = L (G) if
n = 1 and F (G) = f1g otherwise.
Example 3.4 (I) The CIF F 2 F dened for each G 2   as F (G) = L (G) if
L (G) 2 f?; Ng and F (G) = N n L (G) otherwise.
Example 3.5 (L) The CIF F 2 F dened as F (G) = ? for all G 2  .
Among the axioms used in the characterization, symmetricity and independence
as well as monotonicity condition has been dened with some di¤erences by other
authors who wrote in that literature.
13Proofs of all theorems and lemmas stated above can be found in appendix.
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3.1.1 An alternative characterization o¤ered for Liberal CIF
Liberal CIF is central at collective identity determination problem. It gives the right
of self-determination to each individual. In the previous section, it was shown that
the liberal rule satises many fairly acceptable axioms. We now o¤er some alternative
characterization for the liberal rule after introducing some new axioms.
Consider any abstract identity such as being G and a society faced with the ques-
tion of "who are the Gs?". The liberal rule gives the set of individuals who qualies
themselves as a G. Now rename the identity as being non-G. It is natural that each
individual express their opinions for the new identity, being non-G as the complement
of their previous opinions. In same manner, one may expect the new social outcome
is also the complement of previous social opinion. More technically, in aggregation of
being non-G, we face with a new prole G 2   such that Gi = N nGi for all i 2 N ,
and we have F
 
G

= F (G). Note that the liberal rule satises such a condition.
The following axiom which will be introduced again in Section 4, formally dene the
situation above.
Axiom 3.6 A CIF F 2 F satises self-duality (SD) if for any i 2 N and any G 2  ,
we have i 2 F (G) () i =2 F (G).
Self-duality requires that the aggregation rule does not discriminate the name of
identity. Aggregating who are the Gs is equivalent to aggregating who are the non-Gs
in the sense that aggregation will result social opinions, each one is complement of
the other.
The next axiom is the self-exlusion principle. It states that if an individual qualies
all members of society except himself whereas all other individuals has an opinion that
he carries the identity and he is not socially qualied, then he has the right of self
exclusion, that is, he is not socially qualied whenever he does not qualies himself.
Axiom 3.7 A CIF F 2 F satises self-exlusion principle (SE) if for any i 2 N ,
there exist a prole G 2   such that Gi = N n fig and i 2 Gj for all j 2 N n fig and
i =2 F (G), then we have i =2 F (H) for any H 2   with i =2 Hi.
Note that self-exclusion holds if there is a prole at which the individual i is
qualied by all individuals (except him) who are qualied by i but i is not socially
qualied. Otherwise self-exclusion does not impose any restriction on a CIF.
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The liberal rule can also be characterized by consensus, self-duality, the liberal
principle and self-exclusion principle.
Theorem 3.3 A CIF F 2 F satises (C), (SD), (L) and (SE) if and only if it is
the liberal rule.
Proof. The liberal rule L satises all axioms. To see "only if" part, take any CIF F
satisfying (C), (SD), (L) and (SE). We need to show that i 2 Gi implies i 2 F (G)
and i =2 Gi implies i =2 F (G). But observe that by SD, it is enough to show one of
them. Thus take some i 2 N and consider the prole G 2   with Gi = N n fig and
Gj = N for all j 2 N n fig. By C, we have N n fig  F (G). Suppose F (G) = N .
But it contradicts with L since i =2 Gi. So F (G) = N n fig. But by SE, for all H 2  
with i =2 Hi, we have i =2 F (H).
3.2 Procedural Group Identication
The procedure of Kasher (1993) for identity determination starts an initial set of
individuals among whom there is a consensus. Kasher (1993) calls this set as "in-
controvertible core" of the collective identity. Then, further individuals are added to
this set if and only if they are qualied by some members of initial set. Applying this
procedure until the set of members of collective identity does not expand anymore will
give the social opinion about an identity. Since the size of society is nite, the process
eventually stops. Kasher (1993) express the intuition behind this expansion process
as: every socially accepted G as being newly added brings a possibly unique new view
of being a G collectively with him, and a collective identity function is supposed to
aggregate those views and must pay attention to this new individuals G-concept in
order to cover the whole diversity of views in the society about the question "what
does it mean to be a G?". Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) refers this procedural way of
determining collective identity and discuss it. They point Kashers procedure satises
all axioms mentioned by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) except the liberal principle.
Since Kasher (1993) searches a method with only fairness considerations, a condi-
tion about self-determination rights may not be considered as derivable from fairness
considerations only. Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) criticize the way of determining
the initial set and mention another procedure where the initial set is determined by
liberal CIF. Quote from Kasher and Rubinstein (1997):
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The axiomatic characterization of Kashers method remains to be com-
pleted. Note that the di¢ culty in nding a suitable axiomatization is due
to the di¢ culty of justifying why the recursive procedure starts with the
set fi 2 N : i 2 Gj 8j 2 Ng and not with another set, such as fi 2 N : i 2 Gig,
for example.
Dimitrov, Sung, and Xu (2004) axiomatically characterize these two procedural
collective identity functions namely liberal-start-respecting rule and consensus-start-
respecting rule. Each recursive procedure has two parts: An initial set of individuals
and how these individuals are determined. Two procedures di¤er at this step, Kashers
method requires absolute consensus on individuals in this initial set, whereas Kasher
and Rubinstein (1997) suggest to apply liberal rule to determine the initial set. The
second part is the way of expanding this initial set. For each rule, both authors o¤er
same expansion rule i.e. expanding the initial set by adding all individuals qualied
by some members of the initial set. This process continues inductively until the
expansion stops.
More formally, take any CIF F 0 2 F which set up the initial set. For any G 2  
and any non-negative integer k, let F k+1(G) = F k(G) [ fi 2 N : i 2 Gj for some
j 2 F k(G)g. Let k be the smallest integer for which F k+1(G) = F k(G). Dene the
CIF FP 2 F as FP (G) = F k(G) for each G 2  . We call FP the procedural CIF
based on F 0. Though many procedural CIFs can be generated by changing F 0 as
well as changing expansion rule; the liberal-start-respecting procedure, LP proposed
by Dimitrov, Sung, and Xu (2004) and the consensus-start-respecting procedure, CP
proposed by Kasher (1993) are particular procedural CIFs based on the liberal CIF L
(that is F 0 = L) and the consensus CIF C dened below (that is F 0 = C) respectively
with same expansion procedure.14
Denition 3.2 The consensus CIF C 2 F is dened for all G 2   as C (G) =
fi 2 N : i 2 Gj for all j 2 Ng.
Dimitrov, Sung, and Xu (2004) introduce 6 axioms. They have two consensus
axioms rst of which is same with the consensus axiom dened by Kasher and Ru-
binstein (1997) and not given below.15 Second consensus axiom (C2) is a weaking
14The superscript P reects that the rule is procedural and di¤erentiate the procedural rules from
the liberal CIF L and consensus CIF C.
15See Axiom 3.1.
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of the standard one. Three axioms are related how insidersand outsiders views are
treated. Finally they o¤er a stability axiom (ES).
Axiom 3.8 A CIF F 2 F satises consensus 2 (C2) if for some i 2 N we have
i =2 Gj for all j 2 N , then i =2 F (G).
Axiom 3.9 A CIF F 2 F satises irrelevance of an outsiders view 1 (IOV1) if for
all i; j 2 N and for all G;H 2   such that i =2 Gj, Hj = Gj [ fig, Gk = Hk for all
k 2 N nfjg, then [j =2 F (G) and i =2 Hk for some k 2 N ] implies F (G) ji = F (H) ji .
The axiom of irrelevence of outsiders view states that if someone is socially un-
qualied, then this persons opinion about any qualied individual is irrelevant on
deciding that qualied individual. However by existence of some k who disqualies i,
IOV1 excludes the case where an outsiders view is relevant in ones social decision
that is every individual except j qualies i, hence if i add j to the set of qualied
individuals, consensus requires the qualication of individual thus making js opinion
about i relevant. Let us note that IOV1 is weaker then exclusive self determination
axiom introduced by Samet and Schmeidler (2003).16
Axiom 3.10 A CIF F 2 F satises equal treatment of insiders view (ETIV) if for
all i; j; k 2 N and for all G;H 2   such that i 2 Gj, Hj = Gj n fig, Hk = Gk [ fig,
Hl = Gl for all l 2 N n fj; kg, then [j 2 F (G) and k 2 F (H)] implies F (G) ji =
F (H) ji .
ETIV requires that a CIF must equally treat all socially qualied individuals
opinions. More technically, if an individual i is qualied by a member of identity j
in a prole and by a socially qualied individual k in an other prole, then the social
opinion about i must be same provided that all individuals except j and k keeps their
opinions same in two proles.
Axiom 3.11 A CIF F 2 F satises irrelevance of an outsiders view 2 (IOV2) if for
all i; j 2 N with i 6= j and for all G;H 2   such that Hj = Gj [fig, Gk = Hk for all
k 2 N n fjg, then j =2 F (G) implies F (G) ji = F (H) ji .
Note that the liberal rule L fails to satisfy IOV1 since there is no explicit require-
ment that i is di¤erent from j. Hence is self-qualication immediately determine
16See Axiom 3.20
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his social opinion which may cause di¤erent social opinion contrary to what IOV1
requires. Other than the distinction above, IOV2 has same spirit with IOV1.
Axiom 3.12 A CIF F 2 F satises external stability (ES) if for all G 2   and for
all i 2 N , i =2 F (G) implies i =2 Gi.
Note that for a CIF, it may be possible for an individual i that i 2 Gi but i =2 F (G)
or the converse i =2 Gi but i 2 F (G). The stability axioms rules out the possibility of
the rst case. Note that a CIF results a partition (F (G) ; N n F (G)) of the society N
and the stability of the CIF F depends on the satisfaction of individuals of each set
of partition with the result of F . ES deals with the satisfaction of individuals from
N n F (G).
Dimitrov et al. (2004) prove the following theorems.
Theorem 3.4 A CIF F satises the axioms (C2), (ES), (ETIV) and (IOV2) if and
only if F = LP .
Theorem 3.5 A CIF F satises the axioms (C), (ETIV) and (IOV1) if and only if
F = CP .
3.2.1 An alternative characterization o¤ered for Liberal CIF
In previous section the procedural rules for collective identity determination are char-
acterized, we can still provide some alternative characterization for the liberal rule.
We inspire a new axiom, independence of outsidersview from IOV2. It states that so-
cially unqualied members can not reverse social opinion of any qualied member by
changing their opinions about members of identity while keeping their opinions about
unqualied members same provided that all qualied members keeps their opinions
same. In addition, it allows some unqualied members become qualied after the
change in opinions, hence weaking the restriction that axiom impose on the result of
a CIF. The formal denition is given below.17
Axiom 3.13 A CIF F 2 F satises independence of outsidersviews (IOV) if for all
G;H 2   such that Hj = Gj for all j 2 F (G) and Hj\(N n F (G)) = Gj\(N n F (G))
for all j 2 N n F (G), we have F (G)  F (H).
17Note that IOV and IOV2 are logically independent from each other.
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We then introduce an independence axiom which is stronger than the one proposed
by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997).
Axiom 3.14 A CIF F 2 F satises independence (I) if for all i 2 N and for all
G;H 2   such that Gj ji = Hj ji for all j 2 N , then we have F (G) ji = F (H) ji .
This stronger independence axiom was introduced also by Samet and Schmeidler
(2003) and it will be used in characterization of elementary CIFs in Section 4. We are
ready to state an alternative characterization of the liberal rule in terms of consensus,
independence and independence of outsidersviews.
Theorem 3.6 A CIF F 2 F satises C18 , I and IOV if and only if it is the liberal
rule. Moreover all three axioms are independent.
Proof. To see "If" part holds, one can check that the liberal rule satises all three
axioms. To see "only if" part, take any CIF F 2 F satisfying C, I and IOV and any
individual i 2 N . We rst show that for any proles G 2   with Gj 2 f?; figg for all
j 2 N , we have
(1) i 2 Gi implies i 2 F (G) and
(2) i =2 Gi implies i =2 F (G).
To see (1), consider G 2   where Gj = fig for all j 2 N . By C, we have
F (G) = fig. Now take any H 2   with Hj 2 f?; figg for all j 2 N where i 2 Hi.
Since we have Gi = Hi = fig and Hj \ (N n fig) = Gj \ (N n fig) for all j 2 N n fig
by choice of H, IOV implies that fig  F (H). In addition, C requires F (H) = fig.
To see (2), consider G 2   with Gj 2 f?; figg for all j 2 N while Gi = ? and
assume for the sake of a contradiction that i 2 F (G). Note that by C, we have
j =2 F (G) for all j 2 N n fig, hence F (G) = fig. Let H 2   be a prole such
that Hj = ? for all j 2 N . By C, we have F (H) = ?. But as Gi = Hi = ? and
Hj \ (N n fig) = Gj \ (N n fig) for all j 2 N n fig by choice of H, we must have
fig  F (H) by IOV which is not the case, thus leads us the desired contradiction.
Now we extend our analysis to any G 2   and show that
(10) i 2 Gi implies i 2 F (G) and
(20) i =2 Gi implies i =2 F (G).
To see (10), take any H 2   with i 2 Hi. Let M = fj 2 N : i 2 Hjg and G 2  
such that Gj = fig for all j 2 M and Gj = ? for all j 2 N nM . By (1), we have
18See axiom 3.1.
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F (G) = fig and by I, we have F (H) ji = F (G) ji = fig since Hj ji = Gj ji for all
j 2 N . Hence i 2 Gi implies i 2 F (G).
To see (20), take any H 2   with i =2 Hi. Let M = fj 2 N : i =2 Hjg and G 2  
such that Gj = ? for all j 2 M and Gj = fig for all j 2 N nM . By (2), we have
F (G) = ? and by I, we have F (H) ji = F (G) ji = ? since Hj ji = Gj ji for all
j 2 N . Hence i =2 Gi implies i =2 F (G) showing the equivalence of F and the liberal
CIF L.
To see the logical independence of axioms, one can check the following examples.
For an odd n, the simple majority rule M dened as follows: For each G 2   and
each i 2 N , we have i 2 M(G) if and only if #fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg > n2 satises
consensus and independence but violates IOV. To see this consider N = f1; 2; 3g and
the proles G;H 2   where Gj = f1g for all j 2 N and H1 = f1g while Hj = ? for
j 2 f2; 3g. We have F (G) = f1g but F (H) = ? violating IOV since f1g 6 F (H).
The CIF F 2 F dened as F (G) = f1; 2g for all G 2   where N = f1; 2g satises
I and IOV but clearly violates C. Finally one check the following CIF F dened for
any i; j 2 f1; 2g = N satises IOV and C but violates I.
F (G) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
?
K
fig
N
if Gi = ? and Gj = fig
if Gi = K for all i 2 f1; 2g
if Gi = fig and Gj = ?
otherwise
.
3.3 Between Liberalism and Democracy
Samet and Schmeidler (2003) recently study a class of CIFs they called consent rules.
Consent rules are parameterized by the weights given to individuals in determining
their own qualication. For example, in liberalism ones social qualication depends
only his opinion. On the other hand, in majoritarianism one needs to consent of
majority of society to consent his opinion to society. These are the two extremes of
consent rules of Samet and Schmeidler.
Samet and Schmeidler (2003) formally characterize the consent rules which is
formally dened below.
Denition 3.3 A consent rule (with consent quotas s and t such that s+ t  n+2)
is a CIF F st 2 F such that given any G 2   and any i 2 N ,
 if i 2 Gi, then i 2 F st(G)() # fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg  s
20
 if i =2 Gi, then i =2 F st(G)() # fj 2 N : i =2 Gjg  t
The quotas in the denition reects the level of social consent that one need to
make acceptable his opinion on himself as the social opinion. For any given paramaters
s and t19 , if a particular individual qualies himself, then his qualication of himself
is socially adopted if and only if there are s   1 other individual in the society who
also qualies that individual and in the case of ones disqualication of oneself, there
must be t  1 other individuals who disqualify him for social disqualication of that
individual. Therefore the larger the quota s, the less the individual power to consent
his self-qualication and the greater the value of t, the the greater social power to
act against ones self-disqualication. For example, consider the case s = t = 1.
Then ones social qualication or disqualication only depends on ones opinion about
himself. Hence F 11 is equivalent to the liberal rule.20 Now consider, s = 1 and
t = n + 1. If an individual qualies himself, then he is socially qualed by the rule
F 1;n+1. On the other hand, if an individual does not qualies himself, then he needs
to meet quota n+ 1 which is greater than the size of society, hence according to the
rule F 1;n+1, the individual is again socially qualied. Thus F 1;n+1 is equivalent to
the constant rule that each individual is always socially qualied whatever the prole
is.21 Analagously, the rule Fn+1;1 turns out the constant rule which disqualies all
individuals regardless of the opinion prole.
In addition, Samet and Schmeidler not only mention the values of s and t but also
the di¤erence between s and t, js  tj. The smaller di¤erence, the more equally the
rule treats ones qualication versus disqualication. The smallest possible di¤erence
occurs at s = t.22 Samet and Schmeidler advise such rules where being or not-being a
member of identity is socially neutral such as the example they give; being Democrat
and being Republican. Note that the liberal rule is among this neutral rules with
smallest values of quotas as well as the simple majority rule. For an odd n where
both s and t equals to (n+ 1) =2, the consent rule F st becomes the simple majority
rule. In a simple majority rule, ones opinion about himself equally treated with
every other individualsopinion about him in contrast to the liberal rule.23 Though
19The condition s+ t  n+ 2 is related with monotonicity and reects a restriction on the power
of society. This relation will be introduced in proposition 3.1.
20Hence an individual has the full power on his social opinion.
21 In this case, an individual has maximum power to consent his self-qualication, meanwhile the
society also have maximum power to act ones self-disqualication.
22We call them as symmetric consent rules in section 4.1 and show that they are the only consent
rules that are also members of simple CIFs.
23See remark 4.6.
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the liberal rule is neutral in the sense that an individual faces with same quota in each
possible state of the world (self-qualication and self-disqualication), ones vote has
a superior power than another individualsvote which clearly di¤erentiate the liberal
rule from simple majority rule each of which are extremes of neutral rules. Samet and
Schmeidler note that the simple majority is the only nontrivial rule in which ones
vote concerning ones qualication has no special weight.24 Samet and Schmeidler
also discuss the possiblity s 6= t that reects the situations that being qualied or
not-qualied have di¤erent implications. Consider a case that we need to determine
who have the rights to do some acts which are related with others rights. Samet
and Schmeidler gives the right to drive in the public domain which can be related
with being able to cross the road safely as an example. They suggest F st with s > t
for such a situaiton since when one gives up the right to drive, the social consent is
expected to be smaller compared to one wishes to exert his right. On the other hand,
F st with s < t seems appropriate if the identity in question is imposing an obligation.
Think of the example where we wish to determine the ones that works as a volunteer
in an organization or foundation. Since ones self-qualication requires less consent
in contrast to ones withdrawal requires a wider social consent, F st with s < t may
be a suitable way of such a collective identity determination.
Samet and Schmeidler formally characterize consent rules with the following three
axioms: Monotonicity, independence and symmetrcity.
Axiom 3.15 A CIF F 2 F satises monotonicity (MON-SS) if for all G;H 2  
such that Gi  Hi for all i 2 N , we have F (G)  F (H).
Monotocity requires that if each individual expand their set of qualied members
of society, then all individuals who have previously qualied must remain qualied.
Their next axiom is independence axiom which was dened before.25 Independence
axioms states that the social decision about an individuals can be determined by only
knowing each individuals personal opinion about that individuals. Thus for any
two proles at which all members of society have same opinion about a particular
individual, then social opinion of that individual must be same for this two proles.
Axiom 3.16 A CIF F 2 F satises symmetricity (SYM-SS) if given any permuta-
tion  : N ! N , any G 2   and any i 2 N , we have i 2 F (G), (i) 2 F ((G)).
24Clearly, all votes are ine¤ective in the trivial rules F 1;n+1 and Fn+1;1.
25See Axiom 3.14.
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Note that in Section 2, it is stated that the permutation over society can be
interpreted as changing names of individuals. Hence for a symmetric rule, the social
opinion do not depend on names or alternatively if a previously qualied individuals
name changed, then he must be qualied with his new name under same rule provided
that each individual updates their opinions with respect to new names.
Samet and Schmeidler (2003) prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.7 A CIF F 2 F satises MON, I and SYM if and only if it is a consent
rule. Moreover all three axioms are independent.
The proof is omitted, but the idea of proof is as follows: Independence implies that
the social decision of j can be determined by only knowing G jj 2 f?; fjggn. Sym-
metricity implies that the names of individuals does not matter rather the distribution
of other individuals opinions about j and js opinion about himself are important for
social decision. Monotonicty requires that the number votes are important in this
distribution and assigns a minimum value which stands for quota. Finally a reappli-
cation of symmetricity ensures this quota is same for all individuals. The condition
s+ t  n+2 is related with monotonicity and the reason is explaned in the following
paragraph and in proposition 3.1.
For any G 2   and for any j 2 N , we dene a prole G j as follows: Gi = G ji
for all i 2 N n fjg, Gj n fjg = G jj n fjg and j 2 Gj () j =2 G jj . In word, G j is
a prole same with G except individual j changes his opinion about himself. There
are 4 possible outcome that a CIF F may give:
1. F (G) jj = F
 
G j
 jj = fig
2. F (G) jj = F
 
G j
 jj = ?
3. F (G) jj = Gj jj and F
 
G j
 jj = G jj jj
4. F (G) jj = G jj jj and F
 
G j
 jj = Gj jj .
In rst two case, the social decision about j is insensitive to his personal opinion
about himself. In third, the rule respects the personal opinion of j about himself,
whereas in the fourth case, social opinion and personal opinion of j are converse. The
following axiom rules out the existence of fourth possibility.
Axiom 3.17 A CIF F 2 F is said to be non-spiteful (NS) if there exist no prole
G 2   and j 2 N such that F (G) jj 6= Gj jj and F
 
G j
 jj 6= G jj jj .
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Proposition 3.1 Let F 2 F is a consent rule with quotas s; t  n + 1 (without
restriction s+ t  n+ 2). Then the following three conditions are equivalent.
1. s+ t  n+ 2.
2. F is monotonic.
3. F is non-spitefull.
Samet and Schmeidler then showed that adding self-duality to the axiom set will
result that the neutral rules, as discussed at the beginning of this section, are the only
consent rules satisifying SD which will be expressed in the following theorem after
denition of self-duality.
Axiom 3.18 A CIF F 2 F satises self-duality (SD-SS) if given any G 2  , we
have F
 
G

= N n F (G).
Theorem 3.8 A CIF F 2 F satises MON, I, SYM and SD if and only if it is a
consent rule with equal quotas. Moreover all four axioms are independent.
Finally Samet and Schmeidler discuss the right of self-determination. Quoting
from them:
The political principle of self-determination says that a group of people
recognized as a nation has the right to form its own state and choose its
own government. One of the main di¢ culties in applying self-determination
is that it grants the right to exercise sovereignty to well-dened national
identities; it assumes that the self is well dened. In many cases the very
distinct national character of the group is under dispute. Such disputes
can be resolved, at least theoretically, by a voting rule. Here we want to
examine rules which grant the self the right to determine itself.
Then they introduce three further conditions: rst gives sovereignty to citizens
and the latter two are related to the right of self-determination. They give two
characterizations for liberalism by including the self-determination axioms to some
previous axioms.
The rst axiom is in the same spirit of citizen sovereignty condition of Arrow
(1951). It requires the existence of at least two proles for each individual in the soci-
ety at one of which the individual is socially qualied and at the other the individual
is not socially qualied.
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Axiom 3.19 A CIF F 2 F satises nondegeneracy (ND) if for each individual i 2
N , there are proles G;H 2   such that F (G) ji = fig and F (H) ji = ?.
Axiom 3.20 A CIF F 2 F satises exclusive self-determination (ESD) if for any
G;H 2   such that [Gi jj 6= Hi jj =) i =2 F (G) and j 2 F (G)], then we have F (G) =
F (H).
Exclusive self-determination states that applying any rule F to a prole G and
then allowing unqalied members to change their opinions about qualied members
which forms a new prole H must result same social opinion under the same rule F .
The next axiom, a¢ rmative self-determination says that for any rule F and any
prole G, the set of qualied individuals and the set of individuals who qualies the
qualied ones in their personal opinions coincides. Before formal denition, let for
each G 2   dene a new prole GT 2   such that for all i; j 2 N , j 2 Gi () i 2 GTj .
Axiom 3.21 A CIF F 2 F satises a¢ rmative self-determination (ASD) if for any
G 2   we have F (G) = F  GT .
Samet and Schmeidler show that each of these axioms with monotonicity, indepen-
dence and nondegeneracy characterize the liberal CIF L. This two characterization
are stated in the following theorems.
Theorem 3.9 The liberal CIF L is the only CIF that satises ESD, MON, I and
ND.
Theorem 3.10 The liberal CIF L is the only CIF that satises ASD, MON, I and
ND.
25
4 Elementary, Basic and Simple Collective Identity
Functions
4.1 Main Characterizations
For each i 2 N , we dene family !(i)  2N of subsets of N . We refer to !(i) as
the set of winning coalitions over i. The family of winning coalitions over i contains
the sets of individuals who can qualify individual i as a member of identity if they
unanimously agree on individual i carries the identity and they are exactly the set
of individuals qualifying i. The coalitions that are not in !(i) are called losing. We
also dene another family !(i)  2N of subsets of N as the set of blocking coalitions
over i. Contrary to winning coalitions, family of blocking coalitions contains the set
of individuals who can determine an individuals social opinion as unqualied by
not qualifying that individual in their personal opinions while the rest qualies that
individual. Hence, a coalition K is said to be blocking if its complement K = N nK
with respect to N is losing, that is not winning. Note that we do not impose a
requirement whether a coalition K  N can be winning or blocking or neither. Up
to now, it is possible that a coalition may be both winning and blocking or it can be
neither winning nor blocking as well as a coalition can be either an element of !(i)
or !(i) for an individual i 2 N .26 We will discuss this issue later. Before that we
dene several collections of winning coalitions where proper, strong and self-dual ones
impose some particular restrictions over families of winning and blocking coalitions
as discussed above.
A collection f!(i)gi2N of winning coalitions is said to be
 elementary if there is no restriction over family of winning coalitions of any
individual i, that is !(i)  2N for all i 2 N .
 basic if it is elementary and it satises the following condition: for all i 2 N
and for all K;K 0  N with K  K 0, K 2 !(i) implies K 0 2 !(i).
 proper if it is basic and it satises the following condition: for all i 2 N and for
all K  N , K 2 !(i) implies K =2 !(i).27
26A detailed discussion of winning, losing and blocking coalitions can be found in Taylor and
Zwicker (1999).
27 In words, if a coalition K is winning, then K is also blocking.
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 strong if it is basic and it satises the following condition: for all i 2 N and for
all K  N , K =2 !(i) implies K 2 !(i).28
 self-dual if it is both strong and proper, that is, it is basic and it satises the
following condition: for all i 2 N and for all K  N , K 2 !(i) if and only if
K =2 !(i).
Any type of collection f!(i)gi2N of winning coalitions induces a (unique) CIF
F 2 F in the following natural way: Given any G 2   and any i 2 N , we have
i 2 F (G) () fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg 2 !(i).29 We qualify a CIF F 2 F as elementary if
and only if F is induced by an elementary collection f!(i)gi2N of winning coalitions.
In addition, we qualify a CIF F with the name of the collection of winning coalitions
which induce the CIF with only exception that we qualify a CIF F as simple if it is
induced by self-dual collection of winning coalitions.
Elementary CIFs can be characterized in terms of the independence axiom which
was previously introduced30 but restated below for the sake of completeness.
Axiom 4.1 A CIF F 2 F satises independence (I) if for all i 2 N and for all
G;H 2   such that Gj ji = Hj ji for all j 2 N , then we have F (G) ji = F (H) ji .
If a CIF is elementary, the information about how function behaves on proles is
embedded into the winning coalitions. So by using the collection of winning coalitions,
one can construct the same social opinion obtained from an elementary CIF and for an
elementary CIF, it is possible to construct a family of winning coalitions for each in-
dividual such that the social decision about individuals can be obtained from winning
coalitions. Note that there is no restriction over the families of winning coalitions.
For example, !(i) = ? and !(i) = 2N represent two degenerate elementary CIFs31
where i is socially unqualied in all proles by a CIF induced by the former family
of winning coalitions (where all coalitions are losing) whereas the CIF induced from
latter family of winning coalition (where all coalitions are winning) always qualies i.
Adding new axioms will impose some particular structures over winning coalitions.
So we start by introducing a monotonicity axiom.
28 In words, if a coalition K is not winning, then K is not blocking as well.
29Note that a collection f!(i)gi2N of blocking coalitions induces a (unique) CIF F in the same
natural way. The choice does not matter in the sense that one can construct similar result that we
obtain by dening CIFs with respect to winning coalitions. So without loss of generality, we choose
dening elementary CIFs in terms of winning coalitions.
30See Axiom 3.14. This independence axiom is also used by Samet and Schmeidler (2003).
31See Axiom 3.19.
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Axiom 4.2 A CIF F 2 F is said to be monotonic (M) if given any i 2 N and any
two proles G;H 2   such that
 Gj = Hj or Gj = Hj [ fig for all j 2 N and
 9k 2 N such that i =2 Hk but Gk = Hk [ fig
we have i 2 F (H) =) i 2 F (G).
The mononicity condition is quite natural in social choice literature, stating in
terms of winning coalitions that if a coalition is winning over an individual, addi-
tional members to that coalition can not make the new coalition losing. In general,
monotonicity requires that additional opinion about a qualied individual in favour
of his qualication can not cause unqualication of that individual in the new opinion
prole.32 For an elementary CIF, monotonicity imposes a particular structure over
collection of winning coalitions such that for all i 2 N and for all K;K 0  N with
K  K 0, K 2 !(i) implies K 0 2 !(i) which is the condition that basic collection of
winning coalitions satisfy. Hence monotonic elementary CIFs are basic CIFs. More-
over all basic CIFs satisfy independence (hence elementary) and monotonicity. As a
result, basic CIFs33 which are induced by basic collections of winning coalitions can
be characterized with independence and monotonicity.34
Remark 4.1 For a basic CIF F which is induced by the basic collection of winning
coalition f!(i)gi2N , we have either !(i) = ? or N 2 !(i) for all i 2 N .
The remark above states the fact that monotonicity does not guarantee an indi-
viduals qualication in at least one prole. But it requires that if a coalition is able to
qualify an individual, so grand coalition also has power to qualify that individual. We
32Let us note that M and MON-KR (see Axiom 3.3) are logically equivalent. On the other hand,
MON-SS (see Axiom 3.15) is logically stronger than our monotonicity. To see why MON-SS implies
M, observe that the proles G;H 2   in the denition of M satisfy Hj  Gj for all j 2 N , hence
by MON-SS, we have F (H)  F (G). As i 2 F (H) is assumed, we have i 2 F (G). To see why
converse implication may fail, consider the society N = f1; 2g and the CIF F 2 F dened for all
i 2 N and for all G 2   as i 2 F (G) () i 2 Gj for all j 2 N with j 2 Gi. F satises M while
violates MON-SS. However under independence (See Axiom 4.1), our monotonicity and Samet and
Schmeidlers monotonicity turn out to be equivalent.
We also wish to mention that Samet and Schmeidler o¤er a global version of monotonicity in the
sense that both our and Kasher and Rubinsteins monotonicity axioms are dened for a specic
individual i (hence local versions), whereas Samet and Schmeidler dene monotonicity over sets.
33Taylor and Zwicker (1999) call aggregation rules that are induced from a basic collection of
winning coalitions as "simple" rather than basic.
34One can dene a minimal collection of winning coalitions which consists of coalitions all of whose
proper subsets are losing for all individuals. Because of monotonicity, basic CIFs can be represented
with their minimal collection of winning coalitions.
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should also note that monotonicty does not impose a requirement for a coalition to be
winning or blocking, it only imposes if a coalition is winning then its all supersets are
also winning and it gives possibility to a coalition to be both winning and blocking.
We now introduce three versions of self-duality axioms which are related with
the structures of winning and blocking coalitions. To motivate the axioms, we re-
fer the consent rules of Samet and Schmeidler and their suggestions of appropri-
ate rules for the situations: The qualication of individuals having right to drive
in public domain and the qualication of individuals who are imposed a duty or
obligation if they are qualied. In the former case, Samet and Schmeidler pro-
pose a consent rule F st with s > t and in the latter case, they propose F st with
s < t.35 Note that consent rules satisfy independence, hence can be represented
via collection of winning coalitions.36 Thus for N = f1; 2; 3g, consider the rules
F 2;1 and F 1;2. As an example, we write family of winning coalitions of individ-
ual 1. In the former case, we have !(1) = ff1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2; 3gg and !(1) =
ff1g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 2; 3gg. The collection of winning coalitions that induces
F 2;1 is proper but not strong since f1g =2 !(1) and f2; 3g =2 !(1). In the latter case, we
have !(1) = ff1g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 2; 3gg and !(1) = ff1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2; 3gg.
The collection of winning coalitions that induces F 1;2 is strong but not proper since
f1g 2 !(1) and f2; 3g 2 !(1).
At that point, we should mention Taylor and Zwickers observation about strong-
ness and properness. After translating to our model, Taylor and Zwicker states:
If a collection of winning coalitions is not strong, then it has too few win-
ning coalitions at some individuals families of winning coalitions in the
sense that adding su¢ ciently many winning coalitions will make collec-
tion of winning coalitions strong (and the addition of winning coalitions
can never destroy strongness). On the other hand, if a collection of win-
ning coalitions is not proper, then it has too many winning coalitions at
some individuals families of winning coalitions in the sense that delet-
ing su¢ ciently many winning coalitions will make collection of winning
coalitions proper (and the deletion of winning coalitions can never destroy
35For details, one can refer Section 3.3 or Samet and Schmeidler (2003).
36 In addition, consent rules satises our monotonicity. Although our monotonicty and Samet and
Schmeidlers monotonicity di¤er, under independence they are equivalent. See footnote 32. Hence,
in fact, consent rules can be represented via minimal collection of winning coalitions. See footnote
34.
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properness).
At rst glance, it may be thought that there are two type of coalitions; winning
and losing. The intiution behind is that if a coalition is winning over an individual, it
is interpreted as having power to decide that individuals social decision, otherwise it
is said to be losing. So this distinction implicitly assumes if a coalition is winning over
an individual, this coalition has power to determine the individuals social decision as
both qualied and unqualied. But we introduced the families of blocking coalitions
which make possible to discriminate a coalitions power on an individuals social
decision as having power to qualify and having power to unqualify. Hence a coalition
may socially qualify an individual but can not be able to unqualify that individual,
that is the coalition is winning but not blocking. The examples above show this
discrimination is quite natural. For example, for consent rule F 2;1, the coalitions f1g
and f2; 3g are not winning but blocking whereas for consent rule F 1;2, the coalitions
f1g and f2; 3g are winning but not blocking. Observe that the family of winning
coalitions of individual 1 for consent rule F 2;1 coincides with the family of blocking
coalitions of 1 for consent rule F 1;2 and vice versa. The reason is the symmetricity
of quotas of two rules. We now introduce two self duality axioms which lead us to
characterization of proper and strong CIFs.
Axiom 4.3 A CIF F 2 F is said to satisfy self-duality positively (SD+) if for any
i 2 N and for any G 2   with i 2 F (G), we have i =2 F  G.
Axiom 4.4 A CIF F 2 F is said to satisfy self-duality negatively (SD ) if for any
i 2 N and for any G 2   with i =2 F (G), we have i 2 F  G.
For a basic CIF, SD+ impose a particular structure over families of winning coali-
tions such that for all i 2 N and for all K  N , K 2 !(i) implies K =2 !(i) which
is the condition that proper collection of winning coalitions satises and SD  impose
a particular structure such that for all i 2 N and for all K  N , K =2 !(i) implies
K 2 !(i) which is the condition that strong collection of winning coalitions satises.
In addition all proper CIFs satisfy SD+ and all strong CIFs satisify SD . Hence, a
CIF is proper if and only if it satises independence, monotonicity and self-duality
positively and a CIF is strong if and only if it satises independence, monotonicity
and self-duality negatively.
Before combining these two self-duality axioms, we should note that a CIF is
proper if and only if the grand coalition N can not be partioned into two disjoing
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winning coalitions and a CIF is strong if and only if the grand coalition N can not
be partitioned into two disjoint losing coalitions.37 This observation is stated in the
following remark.
Remark 4.2 For a basic CIF F , SD+ impose a particular structure over families
of winning coalitions such that for any i 2 N and for any K;K 0 2 !(i), we have
K\K 0 6= ? and SD  impose a particular structure over families of winning coalitions
such that for any i 2 N and for any K;K 0 =2 !(i), we have K \K 0 6= ?.
We now combine two self-duality axioms in one denition.
Axiom 4.5 A CIF F 2 F is said to satisfy self-duality (SD) if it saties self-duality
both positively and negatively i.e. for any i 2 N and for any G 2  , we have i 2 F (G)
if and only if i =2 F  G.
Self-duality axiom is the combination of the former two self-duality axioms.38 Self-
duality axioms neutralize the distinction between collection of winning and blocking
coalitions. For an elementary CIF F , self-duality requires the coincidence of families
of winning and blocking coalitions for all individuals. More formally, for all i 2 N
and for all K  N , we have K 2 !(i) if and only if K 2 !(i). To see this, let K is
winning over an individual i 2 N . Then by self-duality, N nK is losing which requires
K is also blocking over individual i by denition of blocking coalitions. Now let K is
not winning over an individual i 2 N . Then by self-duality, N nK is winning which
requires K can not be blocking over individual i by denition of blocking coalitions.
Thus for a self-dual elementary CIF, if a coalition is winning over an individual, than
this coalition has the power to determine that individuals social decision as a member
by unanimously qualifying him and as non-member by unanimously unqualifying him.
We now state and prove all characterizations mentioned above.
37Because of monotonicity, properness excludes the possibility of disjoint winning coalitions and
strongness excludes the possibility of disjoint blocking coalitions (regardless of whether their union
is N or not).
38Observe that Samet and Schmeidler o¤er a global version of self-duality (See Axiom 3.18) as in
the case of monotonicity. See footnote 32. However in the case of self-duality, our self-duality (SD)
and Samet and Schmeidlers self-duality (SD-SS) axioms are logically equivalent even under absence
of independence.
To see why SD implies SD-SS, take any G 2   and consider G. Let F (G) = M . By SD, we have
i =2 F  G for all i 2 M . Hence F  G  N nM . Suppose for a contradiction that F  G  N nM ,
that is, there exist j 2 N nM such that j =2 F  G. But by SD, we have j 2 F (G), that is, j 2 M
which leads a contradiction. Thus we have F
 
G

= N nM showing the desired implication.
To see why SD-SS implies SS, take any i 2 N and any G 2  . We need to show that 1)
i 2 F (G) =) i =2 F  G and 2) i =2 F  G =) i 2 F (G). Consider 1, by SD-SS, we have
F
 
G

= N nF (G), hence if i 2 F (G), then i =2 F  G. Now consider 2, if i =2 F  G, then by SD-SS,
we have i 2 F (G).
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Theorem 4.1 Let F 2 F is a CIF. Then
1. F is elementary if and only if it satises independence.
2. F is basic if and only if it satises independence and monotonicity.
3. F is proper if and only if it satises independence, monotonicity and self-duality
positively.
4. F is strong if and only if it satises independence, monotonicity and self-duality
negatively.
5. F is simple if and only if it satises independence, monotonicity and self-duality.
Moreover all axioms are independent.
Proof. Before starting the proof, let for some K  N and for some i 2 N dene
 K;i = fG 2   : i 2 Gk for all k 2 K and i =2 Gk for all k 2 N n Kg as the set of
proles where i is qualied by only the members of K  N .
1. To see "if" part, take any CIF F which satises independence and take any indi-
vidual i 2 N and any coalitionK  N . As F satisies I, for all G 2  K;i we have
either i 2 F (G) or i =2 F (G). Let !(i) = K  N : i 2 F (G) for all G 2  K;i	.
By I, !(i) is well-dened. Applying this argument for all individuals gives a col-
lection f!(i)gi2N of winning coalitions which induces F . To see "only if" part,
let take any elementary CIF F and let f!(i)gi2N be the family of winning coali-
tions which induces F . Take any i 2 N and any G;H 2   with Gj ji = Hj ji
for all j 2 N . Hence fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg = fj 2 N : i 2 Hjg. Without loss of gen-
erality, suppose for a contradiction that i 2 F (G) but i =2 F (H). As i 2 F (G),
we have fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg 2 !(i), so fj 2 N : i 2 Hjg 2 !(i). But this implies
that i 2 F (H) which contradicts with i =2 F (H), establishing the independence
of F .
2. To see "if" part, take any CIF F which satises independence and monotonicity.
By (1), there is a collection of f!(i)gi2N that induces F . We will show that
f!(i)gi2N is a basic collection of winning coalitions. Thus take any individual
i 2 N and any K  K 0  N with K 2 !(i). Suppose for a contradiction
K 0 =2 !(i), that is, i =2 F (G) for all G 2  K0;i. For any given G 2  K0;i,
let H 2  K;i be a prole such that Hj = Gj for all j 2 K [ (N nK 0) and
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Hj = Gj n fig for all j 2 K 0 n K. Note that K = fj 2 N : i 2 Hjg 2 !(i)
implies i 2 F (H). By monotonicity of F , we have i 2 F (G) showing the
collection of winning coalitions is basic. To see "only if" part, take any basic
CIF. By (1), it satises independence. To see F also satises monotonicity, take
any i 2 N and any G;H 2   such that Gj = Hj or Gj = Hj [ fig for all
j 2 N and 9k 2 N such that i =2 Hk but Gk = Hk [ fig. Let assume i 2 F (H).
Hence fj 2 N : i 2 Hjg 2 !(i). Moreover fj 2 N : i 2 Hjg  fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg
by construction. As F is basic, then we have fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg 2 !(i) implying
i 2 F (G) which establishes monotonicity of F .
3. To see "if" part, take any CIF F which satises independence, monotonicity
and self-duality positively. By (2), we have F is induced by a basic collection of
winning coalitions f!(i)gi2N . It is enough to show that it satises the condition:
For all i 2 N and for all K  N , K 2 !(i) implies K =2 !(i). Thus take any
i 2 N and any K 2 !(i) and assume for a contradiction K 2 !(i). As K 2 !(i),
we have i 2 F (G) for all G 2  K;i. For each choice of G 2  K;i, we have
i =2 F  G by SD+. But by independence, we have i =2 F  G for all G 2  K;i
which contradicts the assumption K 2 !(i). To see "only if" part, take any
proper CIF F which is induced from a proper collection of winning coalitions
f!(i)gi2N . By (2), F satises independence and monotonicity. To see F also
satises SD+, take any i 2 N and any G 2   with i 2 F (G) and let G 2   be
the complement of G. Hence fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg 2 !(i) and as F is proper we have
N n fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg =2 !(i). But N n fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg =

j 2 N : i 2 Gj
	
=2
!(i) implies i =2 F  G showing F satises self-duality positively.
4. To see "if" part, take any CIF F which satises independence, monotonicity
and self-duality negatively. By (2), we have F is induced by a basic collection of
winning coalitions f!(i)gi2N . It is enough to show that it satises the condition:
For all i 2 N and for all K  N , K =2 !(i) implies K 2 !(i). Thus take any
i 2 N and any K =2 !(i) and assume for a contradiction K =2 !(i). As K =2 !(i),
we have i =2 F (G) for all G 2  K;i. For each choice of G 2  K;i, we have
i 2 F  G by SD . But by independence, we have i 2 F  G for all G 2  K;i
which contradicts the assumption K =2 !(i). To see "only if" part, take any
strong CIF F which is induced from a strong collection of winning coalitions
f!(i)gi2N . By (2), F satises independence and monotonicity. To see F also
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satises SD , take any i 2 N and any G 2   with i =2 F (G) and let G 2   be
the complement of G. Hence fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg =2 !(i) and as F is strong we have
N n fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg 2 !(i). But N n fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg =

j 2 N : i 2 Gj
	 2
!(i) implies i 2 F  G showing F satises self-duality negatively.
5. To see "if" part, take any CIF F which satises independence, monotonicity
and self-duality. By (2), we have F is induced by a basic collection of winning
coalitions f!(i)gi2N . As SD implies both SD+ and SD , for all i 2 N and for
all K  N , we have K 2 !(i) if and only if K =2 !(i) by (3) and (4) showing
f!(i)gi2N is self-dual. To see "only if" part, take any simple CIF F which is
induced from a self-dual collection of winning coalitions f!(i)gi2N . By (2), F
satises independence and monotonicty. By (3) and (4), F satises both SD+
and SD  respectively, establishes self-duality of F .
To establish the logical independence of independence, monotonicity and self-
duality (positive) and self-duality (negative), one can consider consent rules F 2;1 and
F 1;2 for N = f1; 2; 3g. As Samet and Schmeidlers and our monotonicities coincide
for independent CIFs, both consent rules satisfy independence and monotonicty, but
F 2;1 violates SD  and F 1;2 violates SD+. Moreover, both rules violate SD which is
the fact that shows independence and monotonicity do not imply self-duality.
In addition, the CIF F which is dened for each G 2   as F (G) = N n fi 2 N :
i 2 Gig satises self-duality and independence but not monotonicity. Finally, to see
that the conjunction of self-duality and monotonicity does not imply independence,
consider the CIF F dened as follows: At each G 2   and for all i 2 N ,
 if i 2 Gi, then i 2 F (G) () # fj 2 N n fig : j 2 Gig  n 12
 if i =2 Gi, then i =2 F (G) () # fj 2 N n fig : j =2 Gig  n 12
Note that, as SD implies both SD+ and SD , two examples above can be borrowed
for logical independence of independence, monotonicty and SD+ or SD .
To summarize our ndings, we rst show that all independent CIFs can be ex-
pressed in terms of winning coalitions. Adding monotonicity brings a structure on
collection of winning coalitions such that if a coalition is winning over an individual,
then its all supersets are also winning over that individual. Then we introduce two
self-duality axioms, SD+ and SD  where they make collection of winning coalitions
proper and strong respectively. For a CIF induced by a proper collection of winning
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coalitions, if a coalition is winning over an individual, then it is also losing over that
individual and for a CIF induced by a strong collection of winning coalitions, if a
coalition is not winning over an individual, then it is not blocking either. However,
neither properness nor strongness do not nullify the discrimination between winning
and blocking coalitions. Combining two self-duality axioms into one self-duality re-
move the discrimination above. Thus in the remaining of this section, we concentrate
on simple CIFs, whereas we mention elementary, basic, proper and strong CIFs when-
ever we have specic results for them. Before that we extend our analysis to certain
CIFs of the literature:
1. The liberal CIF L 2 F introduced by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) is dened
for each G 2   as L(G) = fi 2 N : i 2 Gig. L satises MON, SD and I - hence
by Theorem 4.1 is a simple CIF. In fact, its corresponding collection of winning
coalitions is dened for each i 2 N as !(i) = fK 2 2N : i 2 Kg.
2. The consensus CIF C 2 F which can be found in Kasher and Rubinstein (1997)
is dened for each G 2   as C(G) = fi 2 N : i 2 Gj for all j 2 Ng. Although C
satises MON, I and SD+, it fails SD - hence by Theorem 4.1 is a proper CIF. In
fact, its corresponding collection of winning coalitions is dened for each i 2 N
as !(i) = N .
3. The dictatorial CIF Fd 2 F (where some d 2 N is the dictator) which can
also be found in Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) is dened for each G 2   as
Fd(G) = Gd. Fd satises MON, SD and I - hence by Theorem 4.1 is a simple
CIF. Its corresponding collection of winning coalitions is dened for each i 2 N
as !(i) = fK 2 2N : d 2 Kg.
4. Let n be odd. The majoritarian CIF M 2 F which can be found in Samet and
Schmeidler (2003) is dened as follows: For each G 2   and each i 2 N we have
i 2 M(G) if and only if #fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg > n2 . Again M satises MON, SD
and I - hence by Theorem 4.1 is a simple CIF. Its corresponding collection of
winning coalitions is dened for each i 2 N as !(i) = fK 2 2N : #K > n2 g.
5. Procedural CIFs: Take any CIF F 0 2 F . For any G 2   and any non-negative
integer k let F k+1(G) = F k(G) [ fj 2 N : j 2 Gi for some i 2 F k(G)g. Let k
be the smallest integer for which F k+1(G) = F k(G). Dene the CIF FP 2 F as
FP (G) = F k(G) for each G 2  . We call FP the procedural CIF based on F 0.
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The consensus-start-respecting procedure proposed by Kasher (1993) and the
liberal-start-respecting procedure proposed by Dimitrov, Sung, and Xu (2004)
are particular procedural CIFs based on the consensus CIF C and the liberal
CIF L respectively. The consensus-start-respecting procedure, which is based
on a non-simple CIF, fails independence and self-duality. But this is also the
case for the liberal-start-respecting procedure which is based on a simple CIF. In
fact, this incompatibility between procedural and simple CIFs is more general,
as announced by the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1 Take any simple CIF F 0 2 F . The procedural CIF FP based on
F 0 fails independence and self-duality.
Proof. Let F 0 and FP be as in the statement of the proposition. Let f!(i)gi2N be
the family of winning coalitions of the simple CIF F 0. We rst show that FP fails
independence. Take any i 2 N and any K 2 !(i) which di¤ers from N and Nnfig.
Consider the prole G 2   where Gk = Nnfig for all k 2 K and Gk = N for all
k 2 NnK. So F 0(G) = Nnfig and, as K di¤ers from Nnfig and N , FP (G) = N .
Now consider the prole H 2   where Hk = ; for all k 2 K and Hk = fig for
all k 2 NnK. As NnK =2 !(i), we have F 0(H) = ; = FP (H). Remark that
i 2 Gk , i 2 Hk for all k 2 N , while i 2 FP (G) but i =2 FP (H), showing that FP
fails independence.
To see that FP fails self-duality, take any i 2 N and any K 2 !(i) which di¤ers
from Nnfig and N . Consider the prole G 2   where Gk = Nnfig for all k 2 K
and Gk = N for all k 2 NnK. So F 0(G) = Nnfig and, as K di¤ers from Nnfig and
N , FP (G) = N . Now consider the prole H 2   where Hk = fig for all k 2 K and
Hk = ; for all k 2 NnK. As K 2 !(i), we have F 0(H) = fig = FP (H). Remark
that Hk = N n Gk for all k 2 NnK, while i 2 FP (G) \ FP (H), showing that FP
fails self-duality.
6. The consent rules of Samet and Schmeidler (2003) are parametrized by two
positive integers s and t with s+ t  n+2. A consent rule (with consent quotas
s and t) is a CIF F st 2 F such that given any G 2   and any i 2 N
 if i 2 Gi, then i 2 F st(G)() # fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg  s
 if i =2 Gi, then i =2 F st(G)() # fj 2 N : i =2 Gjg  t
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Taking s = t is a case of particular interest where we call F st a symmetric consent
rule (with quota s) and denote it F s. Remark that for symmetric consent rules, the
quota varies between s = 1 and s = bn2 c + 1.39 At one extreme where s = 1, F s
coincides with the liberal CIF L. At the other extreme where s = bn2 c+ 1, we go to
majoritarianism.40
Not every consent rule is simple. In fact, the intersection of the set of consent
rules with the set of simple CIFs is the set of symmetric consent rules - a result which
we formally state in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.2 A consent rule F st 2 F is a simple CIF if and only if F st is a
symmetric consent rule, i.e., s = t.
Proof. To prove the only ifpart, we refer to Proposition 2 of Samet and Schmeidler
(2003) which establishes that a consent rule satises self-duality if and only if it is a
symmetric consent rule. This result, combined with our Theorem 4.1, implies that
a consent rule is a simple CIF only if it is a symmetric consent rule. To show the
ifpart, we check that symmetric consent rules satisfy MON, SD and I41 -hence are
simple CIFs by Theorem 4.1.
Remark 4.3 When n is odd while s 2 f1; :::; bn2 c+1g or n is even while s 2 f1; :::; n2 g,
the winning coalitions of the symmetric consent rule F s are dened for every i 2 N
as !(i) = fK 2 2N : i 2 K and s  #K  n  sg [ fK 2 2N : #K > n  sg. So !(i)
consists of coalitions
- whose cardinality varies from s to n  s while they contain i42
- whose cardinality exceeds n  s (independent of whether they contain i or not).
On the other hand, when n is even and s = n2 +1, we have !(i) = fK 2 2N : i =2 K
and #K = n=2g[ fK 2 2N : #K > n2 g for every i 2 N .
In addition, the consent rules with di¤erent quotas are not simple but they in-
tersect with proper and strong CIFs. In details, all consent rules F st with s  t are
proper CIFs and all consent rules F st with s  t are strong CIFs. This is formally
stated in the following proposition.
39We write bn=2c for the highest integer less than or equal to n=2.
40This has two subcases which is worth distinguishing. When n is odd, F bn=2c+1 coincides with
the majoritarian CIF M . When n is even, we have two versions of majoritarianism depending on
the choice of s 2 fn
2
; n
2
+ 1g. When s = n=2, a coalition K of cardinality n=2 is winning over an
individual i if and only if i is a member of K: On the other hand, when s = n
2
+ 1, a coalition K of
cardinality n=2 is winning over an individual i if and only if i is not a member of K:
41A result which is also established by Theorem 2 of Samet and Schmeidler (2003).
42Remark that there is no such coalition when n is odd and s = bn
2
c+ 1.
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Proposition 4.3 A consent rule F st 2 F is a proper CIF if and only if s  t and a
consent rule F st 2 F is a strong CIF if and only if s  t.
Proof. To see "if" part of the rst statement, we refer to Theorem 1 of Samet
and Schmeidler (2003) which establishes all consent rules satises independence and
monotonicity. Hence all consent rules F st with s  t are basic CIFs by our Theorem
4.1 and can be represented with a basic collection of winning coalitions. Thus let
f!(i)gi2N is the basic collection of winning coalitions that induces F st with s  t.
We need to show that f!(i)gi2N be a proper collection of winning coalitions. Note
that if K 2 !(i) for some i 2 N , we have either #K  s and i 2 K or #K > n   t
while i =2 K. Consider the case 1, we have #K  n  s and i =2 K. As s  t, we have
#K  n  t implying K =2 !(i). Consider the case 2, we have #K < t and i 2 K. As
s  t, we have #K < s implying K =2 !(i).
To see "only if" part of the rst statement, let F st be a proper consent rule and let
f!(i)gi2N be the proper collection of winning coalitions that induces F st. Suppose
for a contradiction that s < t. Let for some i 2 N , K  N be a coalition such
that #K = s and i 2 K. As F st is a consent rule, we have K 2 !(i). Moreover
#K = n  s and i =2 K. As we assume s < t, we have #K > n  t implying K 2 !(i)
contradicting f!(i)gi2N is a proper collection of winning coalitions.
To see "if" part of the second statement, we refer to Theorem 1 of Samet and
Schmeidler (2003) which establishes all consent rules satises independence and monotonic-
ity. Hence all consent rules F st with s  t are basic CIFs by our Theorem 4.1 and
can be represented with a basic collection of winning coalitions. Thus let f!(i)gi2N
be the basic collection of winning coalitions that induces F st with s  t. We need to
show that f!(i)gi2N is a strong collection of winning coalitions. Note that if K =2 !(i)
for some i 2 N , we have either #K < s and i 2 K or #K  n   t while i =2 K.
Consider the case 1, we have #K > n  s and i =2 K. As s  t, we have #K > n  t
implying K 2 !(i). Consider the case 2, we have #K  t and i 2 K. As s  t, we
have #K  s implying K 2 !(i).
To see "only if" part of the rst statement, let F st be a strong consent rule and
let f!(i)gi2N be the strong collection of winning coalitions that induces F st. Suppose
for a contradiction that s > t. Let for some i 2 N , K  N be a coalition such that
#K = s   1 and i 2 K. As F st is a consent rule, we have K =2 !(i). Moreover
#K = n  s+ 1 and i =2 K. As we assume s > t, we have #K < n  t+ 1 implying
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K =2 !(i) contradicting f!(i)gi2N is a strong collection of winning coalitions.
Note that Proposition 4.2 is a corollary of Proposition 4.3. Since all simple CIFs,
by Theorem 4.1, are both proper and strong, by Proposition 4.3, we have s = t.
Moreover, all symmetric consent rules are proper and strong by Proposition 4.3, hence
simple by Theorem 4.1.
4.2 Equal Treatment of Individuals
The literature of social choice theory contains two well-known equal treatment con-
ditions, one for voters (usually called anonymity) and one for outcomes (usually
called neutrality). In a framework where voters and alternatives form mutually
exclusive sets, the conceptual discrimination between these two conditions is straight-
forward. On the other hand, the matter is more complicated to handle when voters
and outcomes coincide - as is the case in our model.
Samet and Schmeidler (2003) by-pass the problem by introducing a symmetry
condition which incorporates both kinds of equal treatment conditions.43 We say that
a CIF F 2 F is Samet-Schmeidler symmetric if and only if given any permutation
 : N ! N , any G 2   and any i 2 N , we have i 2 F (G), (i) 2 F ((G)).
Remark 4.4 For a simple CIF F , Samet-Schmeidler symmetry imposes a particular
structure over the family of winning coalitions f!(i)gi2N so that given any  : N !
N , any i 2 N and any K 2 2N , we have K 2 !(i), (K) 2 !((i)).
It is possible to extract from Samet-Schmeidler symmetry, a votersequal treat-
ment property which requires that while deciding whether some individual i 2 N is
a J , all individuals, with the possible exception of i him/herself, must be equally
treated. For some i 2 N , let  i : N ! N stand for some bijection with  i(i) = i.
Then the formal denition of anonimity is given below.
Axiom 4.6 A CIF F 2 F is anonymous if for all i 2 N and for all G 2  , we have
i 2 F (G),  i(i) = i 2 F ( i(G)).
Clearly, Samet-Schmeidler symmetry implies anonymity.44
Remark 4.5 For a simple CIF F , anonymity imposes a particular structure over the
family of winning coalitions f!(i)gi2N so that for each i 2 N and for all K 2 2N ,
43See Section 4.1 of Samet and Schmeidler (2003) where they discuss their symmetry axiom.
44While the converse implication does not hold as we show through an example in Footnote 45
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K 2 !(i) ,  i(K) 2 !(i). In other words, a coalition K, which does not contain
individual i, is winning over i if and only if every coalition K 0 with #K 0 = #K and
which does not contain i is winning over i as well. Similarly, a coalition K, which
contains i, is winning over i if and only if every coalition K 0 with #K 0 = #K and
which contains i is winning over i as well.
Anonymous simple CIFs can be characterized in terms of what we call generalized
symmetric consent rules. Fix some n-tuple of positive integers s = (s1; :::; sn) such
that si 2 f1; :::; bn2 c+ 1g for each i 2 N . A generalized symmetric consent rule (with
quota s) is a CIF F s 2 F such that given any G 2   and any i 2 N
if i 2 Gi, then i 2 F s(G)() # fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg  si
if i =2 Gi, then i =2 F s(G)() # fj 2 N : i =2 Gjg  si
Note that symmetric consent rules of Samet and Schmeidler (2003) are particular
cases of F s where s is such that si = sj for all i; j 2 N .45
Theorem 4.2 A CIF F 2 F is simple and anonymous if and only if F is a general-
ized symmetric consent rule F s with si 2 f1; :::; bn2 c+ 1g for each i 2 N .
Proof. We leave the ifpart to the reader by asking to check that any generalized
symmetric consent rule F s satises anonymity, MON, SD and I, which, by Theorem
4.1, implies that F s is anonymous and simple. To show the only ifpart, take any
simple and anonymous CIF F 2 F with a family of winning coalitions f!(i)gi2N . For
each i 2 N , let si = min f#K : K 2 w (i)g. First, consider the case where n is odd.
As, by the denition of a winning coalition, either K 2 !(i) or N nK 2 !(i) holds
for each K 2 2N , we have si 2 f1; :::; bn2 c+ 1g. Moreover, there exists K 2 !(i) with
i 2 K and #K = si. To see this, suppose the contrary. In case si 2 f1; :::; bn2 cg,
there exists, by the anonymity of F , K;K 0 2 !(i) such that #K = #K 0 = si
while K \ K 0 = ;, which contradicts the denition of a winning coalition. In case
si = bn2 c + 1, there exists, by the denition of a winning coalition, K 2 !(i) with
i =2 K and #K = bn2 c, which contradicts the choice of si = min f#K : K 2 w (i)g.
Now, as there exists K 2 !(i) with i 2 K and #K = si, by the anonymity of F , we
have K 2 !(i) for any K 2 2N with i 2 K and #K = si. Moreover, as F satises M,
we have K 2 !(i) for any K 2 2N with i 2 K and #K  si. So, fK 2 2N : i 2 K
and #K  sig  !(i). As si = min f#K : K 2 w (i)g, by the denition of a winning
45 In fact, a generalized symmetric consent rule F s where si 6= sj for some i; j 2 N is an example
of a CIF which is anonymous but not Samet-Schmeidler symmetric. See Footnote 44.
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coalition we have fK 2 2N : #K > n  sig  !(i). By the fact that either K 2 !(i)
or N n K 2 !(i) holds for each K 2 2N , we have !(i) = fK 2 2N : i 2 K and
#K  sig [ fK 2 2N : #K > n  sig. So, we conclude, by referring to Remark 4.3,
that the decision over i is taken according to a symmetric consent rule with quota si.
Now consider the case where n is even. As for each K 2 2N , either K 2 !(i) or
N nK 2 !(i) holds, we have si 2 f1; :::; n2 g. In case si 6= n2 , the arguments we used
for the case where n is odd show the existence of K 2 !(i) with i 2 K and #K = si
and the anonymity and monotonicity of F similarly establishes that the decision over
i is taken according to a symmetric consent rule with quota si. In case si = n2 , we
have, by the anonymity of F and the denition of a winning coalition, two possible
mutually exclusive cases:
CASE 1: K 2 !(i) for all K 2 2N with i 2 K and #K = n2 while K =2 !(i) for all
K 2 2N with i =2 K and #K = n2 :
CASE 2: K 2 !(i) for all K 2 2N with i =2 K and #K = n2 while K =2 !(i) for all
K 2 2N with i 2 K and #K = n2 .
For CASE 1, by the monotonicity of F , we have !(i) = fK 2 2N : i 2 K
and #K = sig [ fK 2 2N : #K > n   sig. So we conclude, by referring to
Remark 4.3, that the decision over i is taken according to a symmetric consent
rule with quota si = n2 . For CASE 2, by the monotonicity of F , we have !(i) =
K 2 2N : i =2 K and #K = n=2	[ fK 2 2N : #K > n2 g. So we conclude, by refer-
ring to Remark 4.3, that the decision over i is taken according to a symmetric consent
rule with quota si + 1 = n2 + 1.
Remark that while deciding on the identity of some i 2 N , anonymity does not
bring any restriction on the decision power of i compared to the (equal) decision
powers of the other individuals. In other words, under anonymity, while all individuals
but i are equally treated as voters, the opinion of i about him/herself may be favored,
disfavored or equally treated compared to the other individualsopinions over i. The
following three conditions classify the set of simple and anonymous CIFs according
to this notion:
SF+: A simple and anonymous CIF F 2 F with a family of winning coalitions
f!(i)gi2N is self-favoring for i 2 N if and only if
 there exists K 2 2N with i =2 K and K =2 !(i) such that given any j 2 K we
have (K n fjg)[ fig 2 !(i).
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 for all K 2 2N with i =2 K, we have K 2 !(i) =) (K n fjg)[ fig 2 !(i) for all
j 2 K
SF : A simple CIF F 2 F with a family of winning coalitions f!(i)gi2N is
self-disfavoring for i 2 N if and only if
 there exists K 2 2N with i 2 K and K =2 !(i) such that given any j 2 NnK we
have (K n fig)[ fjg 2 !(i).
 for all K 2 2N with i 2 K, we have K 2 !(i) =) (K n fig)[ fjg 2 !(i) for all
j 2 NnK
SF 0: A simple CIF F 2 F with a family of winning coalitions f!(i)gi2N is self-
disregarding for i 2 N if and only if given any K 2 2N with i 2 K and any j 2 NnK,
we have K 2 !(i) , (K n fig)[ fjg 2 !(i).
This treatment of self-opinions by generalized symmetric consent rules depends
on the quota si and the number of individuals n in the society, as we remark below:
Remark 4.6 A generalized symmetric consent rule F s 2 F is
(i) self-favoring for i 2 N if and only if si 2 f1; :::; bn2 cg
(ii) self-disfavoring for i 2 N if and only if n is even and si = n2 + 1
(iii) self-disregarding for i 2 N if and only if n is odd and si =

n
2

+ 1
Observe that almost all generalized symmetric consent rules are self-favoring, ex-
cept two cases: When n is even, it is self-disfavoring to determine the identity of i by
a version of majoritarianism where a coalition K of cardinality n=2 is winning over
an individual i if and only if i is not a member of K.46 Similarly, when n is odd,
determining individual identities by (usual) majoritarianism is self-disregarding.
We now turn to the equal treatment of individuals as outcomes. Recall that Samet-
Schmeidler symmetry is pretended to reect the equal treatment property both for
voters and outcomes. Our anonymity condition extracts the former part of this.
Hence, we allow ourselves to say that a CIF F 2 F is Samet-Schmeidler neutral if
and only if given any permutation  : N ! N with (i) 6= i, any G 2   and any
i 2 N , we have i 2 F (G) , (i) 2 F ((G)). Samet-Schmeidler neutrality is quite
46See footnote 40
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a demanding condition. In fact, it is equivalent to Samet-Schmeidler symmetry.47
Moreover, dictatorial CIFs, which are perfectly consistent with the idea of using the
same decision rule for all individuals, fail to satisfy it.48 Not only this clashes with
the standard connotation of neutrality and dictatoriality in social choice theory, but
it also seems to impose a structure more than necessary to ensure that the same rule
is used by society to determine the qualication of each individual.49
Thus, we look for a less demanding neutrality condition which ensures the equal
treatment of individuals as outcomes while it is congruous to our model as well as
to the usual connotations of social choice theory. The complication of the matter
arises from the fact that voters and outcomes coincide. So we propose to impose the
usual neutrality requirement only for cases where voters and outcomes di¤er in the
following axiom.
Axiom 4.7 A CIF F 2 F is essentially neutral if and only if given any i; j 2 N , the
existence of some G 2   with i =2 Gi [Gj and i 2 F (G) implies the existence of some
G0 2   with j 2 G0k , i 2 Gk for all k 2 N such that j 2 F (G0).
Remark 4.7 For simple CIFs, essential neutrality imposes a particular structure
over the family of winning coalitions f!(i)gi2N so that for any i; j 2 N and for any
K 2 2N with i; j =2 K, we have K 2 !(i) =) K 2 !(j).50
In words, for simple CIFs, essential neutrality imposes that a coalition K which
excludes some i; j 2 N is winning over i if and only if K is winning over j - a
requirement which incorporates the usual neutrality idea to our model for cases where
those who decide and those over which the decision is made form disjoint sets.
Note that even when simple CIFs are essentially neutral, two individuals may
have smallest winning coalitions of di¤erent cardinalities - a fact which certainly
47Samet-Schmeidler symmetry, by denition, implies Samet-Schmeidler neutrality. To see the
converse implication, dene for each i; j 2 N , a bijection ij : N ! N as ij (i) = j, ij (j) = i and
ij (k) = k for all k 2 N nfi; jg. Note that any bijection over N can be expressed as the composition
of some family of bijections ij over N . Thus every CIF that is Samet-Schmeidler neutral is also
Samet-Schmeidler symmetric.
48To see this, consider a society N = f1; 2g: Let F1 be the CIF where individual 1 is the dictator.
Thus, we have !(1) = !(2) = ff1g; f1; 2gg. On the other hand, given that f1g 2 !(1), Samet-
Schmeidler neutrality requires that f2g 2 !(2). This requirement implicitly assumes that f1g 2 !(1)
because the opinion of individual 1 about himself is particular - which is not the case when 1 is
the dictator. To be sure, under F1, the opinion of individual 1 about him/herself is fully decisive.
However, this is a result of the fact that the CIF in question concentrates all decision power to 1
and not because that the opinions of individuals about themselves are favored.
49See Samet and Schmeidler (2003), Section 4.1, p.225.
50This can be expressed, in terms of permutations, as follows: Given any i; j 2 N , any ij : N ! N
(as dened in Footnote 47) and any K 2 2N with i; j =2 K, we have K 2 !(i) =) ij (K) = K 2
!(j).
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contradicts the idea of using the samerule for all individuals.51 So we strengthen
essential neutrality by adding a requirement such that all individualssmallest winning
coalitions must have the same cardinality.
Axiom 4.8 A CIF F 2 F as neutral whenever F is essentially neutral and given any
i; j 2 N , any G 2   with i 2 F (G), there exists G0 2   with # fk 2 N : j 2 G0kg =
# fk 2 N : i 2 Gkg such that j 2 F (G0).
This last condition can be translated to the world of simple CIFs as the require-
ment that all individuals have smallest winning coalitions of the same cardinality.52
Our next result is a characterization of simple, anonymous and neutral CIFs.
Theorem 4.3 A CIF F 2 F is simple, anonymous and neutral if and only if F is a
symmetric consent rule F s with s 2 f1; :::; bn2 c+ 1g.
Proof. To show the ifpart, take any symmetric consent rule F swith s 2 f1; :::; bn2 c+
1g. As every symmetric consent rule is, by denition, a generalized consent rule, we
know by Theorem 4.2 that F s is simple and anonymous. It is straightforward to check
that symmetric consent rules are neutral. To prove the only ifpart, take any simple,
anonymous and neutral CIF F . As F is simple and anonymous, by Theorem 4.2, it is
a generalized symmetric consent rule F s. Consider rst the case where n is odd. As
F s is neutral, hence the smallest winning coalitions of all individuals are of the same
cardinality, we have si = sj for all i; j 2 N , showing that F s is a symmetric consent
rule. Now consider the case where n is even. As F s is neutral, hence the smallest
winning coalitions of all individuals are of the same cardinality, we have si 6= sj for
some i; j 2 N only if si; sj 2 fn2 ; n2 + 1g. But essential neutrality implies that there
exists no i; j 2 N such that si = n2 and sj = n2 + 1, showing that F s is a symmetric
consent rule.
Remark that Theorem 4.3 is related to Theorem 2 of Samet and Schmeidler (2003)
which characterizes symmetric consent rules in terms of independence, monotonic-
ity, self-duality and Samet-Schmeidler symmetry. It immediately follows from juxta-
posing Theorem 2 of Samet and Schmeidler (2003) with our Theorems 4.1 and 4.3
that for simple CIFs, Samet-Schmeidler symmetry is equivalent to the conjunction
51For example, when N = f1; 2; 3g, the generalized symmetric consent rule F s with s = (1; 1; 2) is
essentially neutral while individuals 2 and 3 have smallest winning coalitions of di¤erent cardinalities.
52This requirement does not imply essential neutrality, as one can check through the generalized
symmetric consent rule F s with s = (2; 2; 2; 3) used in the society N = f1; 2; 3; 4g.
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of anonymity and neutrality.53 On the other hand, on the general domain of CIFs,
Samet-Schmeidler symmetry is stronger than anonymity and neutrality.54 So over
the domain of simple CIFs, the anonymity and neutrality conditions we propose suc-
cessfully decompose the symmetry condition of Samet and Schmeidler (2003) which
is an incorporation of both equal treatment properties.
4.3 Characterizing Liberalism
This section contains various characterizations of the liberal CIF. We start by con-
sidering a specic prole G0 with G0i = fig for all i 2 N , where each individual only
considers him/herself as a J . As we remark below, the behavior of simple CIFs on
G0 determines the set of individuals who have the right of self-determination.
Remark 4.8 Take any simple CIF F 2 F with a family of winning coalitions f!(i)gi2N .
For any i 2 N , we have !(i) = fK 2 2N : i 2 Kg if and only if i 2 F (G0).
Liberalism is the assignment of the right of self-determination to each individual.
So the behavior of CIFs over G0 is critical in characterizing liberalism. We say
that a CIFF 2 F satises the weak equal treatment property (WETP) if and only if
F (G0) 2 f;; Ng. WETP is satised positively in case F (G0) = N and negatively
when F (G0) = ;. The following theorem characterizes the liberal CIF as the unique
simple CIF that satises WETP positively.
Theorem 4.4 A simple CIF F 2 F satises the weak equal treatment property posi-
tively if and only if F is the liberal CIF.
Proof. The ifpart immediately follows from the denitions of the liberal CIF and
the positive WETP. To see the only ifpart, take any simple CIF F that satises
WETP positively. By Remark 4.8, we have !(i) = fK 2 2N : i 2 Kg for each i 2 N ,
which means that F is the liberal CIF.
Theorem 4.4 paves the way to another characterization of the liberal CIF through
a liberalism axiom introduced by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) who say that a CIF
53Recall that although the Samet and Schmeidler (2003) monotonicity condition is stronger than
ours, the two monotonicities coincide under independence.
54Samet-Schmeidler symmetry implies anonymity directly by the denitions of the two concepts.
To see that Samet-Schmeidler symmetry implies neutrality, one can use ij permutation for any
i; j 2 N and for any G 2  . Finally, in a society N = f1; 2; 3g, the (non-simple) CIF F :   ! 2N
which is dened at each G 2   as 1 2 F (G) , fi 2 N : 1 2 Gig  f2; 3g and for k 2 f2; 3g we
have k 2 F (G) , #fi 2 N : k 2 Gig  2 examplies a CIF that is anonymous, neutral but not
Samet-Schmeidler symmetric.
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F 2 F satises the liberal principle if and only if for each G 2  , 9 i 2 N with i 2 Gi
=) F (G) 6= ? and 9 i 2 N with i =2 Gi =) F (G) 6= N .
Theorem 4.5 A simple CIF F 2 F satises the weak equal treatment property and
the liberal principle if and only if F is the liberal CIF.
Proof. The ifpart can be seen by checking that the liberal CIF satises WETP and
the liberal principle. To see the only ifpart, take any simple CIF F that satises
WETP and the liberal principle. By WETP, we have F (G0) 2 f;; Ng while the
liberal principle rules F (G0) = ; out. So F (G0) = N , which means that F satises
WETP positively and, by Theorem 4.1, F is the liberal CIF.
Finally, we show that as the liberal CIF is the unique symmetric consent rule that
satises liberal principle.
Theorem 4.6 A simple, neutral and anonymous CIF F 2 F satises the liberal
principle if and only if F is the liberal CIF.
Proof. The ifpart can be seen by checking that the liberal CIF satises the liberal
principle. To see the only if part, take any simple, neutral and anonymous CIF
F which, by Theorem 4.3, is a symmetric consent rule. Let F satisfy the liberal
principle. Note that F satises WETP by the denition of a symmetric consent rule.
So by Theorem 4.5, F is the liberal CIF.
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5 Conclusion
We consider a model of aggregating vectors of sets into a set. This mathematical
structure is su¢ ciently rich to allow various interpretations such as the qualication
problem where a set of objects is to be partitioned as goodsand badsdepending
on individuals opinions55 ; electing committees by approval balloting where voters
may approve any set of candidates56 ; deciding over accepting or rejecting a set of
issues57 or more generally the aggregation of individual choices into a social choice.58
The interpretation we explore is the collective identity determination problem, pro-
posed by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997), where individualsopinions about Who is a
Jare aggregated into a social decision.59 We introduce a family of elementary CIFs
which are aggregation rules that can be expressed in terms of winning coalitions. We
then look into the e¤ects of adding new axioms on the structure of collection of win-
ning coalitions. However our main focus is on simple CIFs which we characterize in
terms of three axioms, namely independence, self-duality and monotonicity. Many
interesting CIFs of the literature, including (symmetric) consent rules introduced by
Samet and Schmeidler (2003), are simple. The class of simple CIFs exhibits the
following properties:
 The family of anonymous and neutral CIFs coincides with the family of sym-
metric consent rules ranging from liberalism to majoritarianism.
 The family of anonymous CIFs coincides with the family of generalized sym-
metric consent rules.
 All neutral CIFs, but dictatoriality, satisfy WETP.
 An anonymous CIF F fails WETP if and only if F is a generalized symmetric
consent rule F swith si = 1 for some i 2 N and sj > 1 for some j 2 N .
 Liberalism is the unique CIF that satises WETP positively.
55 such as the analysis made by Dimitrov et al. (2004) and Ju (2005a)
56 examples of which can be found in Brams et al. (2005b) and Brams et al. (2005a)
57 see Ju (2005b)
58Aleskerov (1999) and Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995) give an excellent treatment of the choice
aggregation problem. We wish to say that the plethora of results they establish in an abstract
framework can certainly bring further insights to particular applications of aggregating choices, such
as the one we consider in this paper. See also Lahiri (2001) and Quesada (2003).
59Under this nal interpretation, voters and outcomes coincide, which is not case in the quali-
cation or the committee election problem. This leads to subtleties such as special treatments of
self-qualicationand ner distinctions between the standard anonymity and neutrality conditions
of social choice theory - matters which we adress and handle in this paper.
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 Among non-anonymous and non-neutral CIFs there are those which do and
those which do not satisfy WETP.
The following gure summarizes our ndings regarding simple CIFs:
Their ability of expressing the aggregation rule through families of winning coali-
tions makes simple CIFs of particular interest. Moreover, independence, self-duality
and monotonicity are conditions which are very suitable for the identity aggregation
context.60 It is also to emphasize that among simple CIFs, the liberal one arises as the
unique CIF that satises positive WETP, which is an intuitive and fairly mild axiom.
This supports the idea of endowing individuals with the right of self-determination -
hence embracing liberalism as a natural solution to the collective identity determina-
tion problem.
For further researches in that topic, one can o¤er a full characterization of neutral
simple CIFs. Just to give an idea, writing an acceptable self-dual family of winning
coalition for some individual and copying it to all individuals induces a neutral simple
60Though they would not be that appropriate for other interpretations of our model, such as the
committee election problem.
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CIF. However, dictatorial consent rules F std dened for some xed individual d 2 N
and for any i 2 N and any G 2   as follows:
 if i 2 Gd, then i 2 F (G) () # fj 2 N : i 2 Gjg  s
 if i =2 Gd, then i =2 F (G) () # fj 2 N : i =2 Gjg  t
are simple and neutral and families of winning coalitions for each individuals
di¤er.61 Moreover, in our model, each individual has same weight over social opinion
of an individual. It can be thought that there is a matrix W = [wij ] of weights where
wij represents individuals is power on deciding social opinion of j. In addition to
neutral simple CIFs or weighted rules, it is possible to construct di¤erent models.
For example, one can treat the collective identity determination problem as searching
set of strict rules that di¤erentiate socially acceptable members and non-members.
Hence, there may be a nite set of criterias C = (1; :::; c) that are related with the
identity in question and the degree that each individual i satises the criterias k can
be represented with a value ki from [0; 1] interval. Then i =
 
ki

k2C is the vector
showing the satisfaction of criteria degrees of individual i and  = figi2N forms a
criteria prole. A CIF may aggregate each possible criteria proles into a nal unique
value for each individual. As a last suggestion for further researches, in our model
individuals have to express their personal opinions about an individual as either a
member or non-member. This construction is appropriate when the size of society is
small. But if the size expands, some individuals may not have enough information
about some members of society to qualify them as member or non-member. This
situation can be modelled with three partition
 
N+; N0; N 

of society, N as personal
opinions62 and a CIF may aggregate this personel opinions into a social opinion which
may be again a three partition of society or restricted to two partition as in our
model. Observe that in the model suggested above, the individuals preferences can
be interpreted as trichotomous preferences where each N+; N0; N  stands for an
equivalence classes.
61 In dictatorial consent rule, there is a dictator but he needs to meet some quotas (s and t for
each state of world) to consent his opinion about an individual i to society.
62Note that, in our model, N0 = ? for each individual.
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Appendix
A Proofs of Previous Theorems
Proofs of Theorems of Section 3.1
Proof of Lemma 3.1. We will prove the statement by induction of #K of K
by showing for all K  N , we have F  GK = K and F  GNnK = N n K which
is equivalent to show that for all K  N , we have F  GK = K. Let take any CIF
F 2 F satisfying SYM-KR, I-KR and L and any K  N . Note that any i; j 2 K
is symmetric in the prole GK as well as any k;m 2 N nK, hence by SYM-KR, we
have F
 
GK
 2 f?;K;N nK;Ng. If #K = 0, then we have F (G?) 2 f?; Ng. As
L excludes the possibility of F (G?) = N , we have F (G?) = ?. Analogously, we
have F
 
GN

= N . Moreover note that for any K di¤erent from ? and N , we have
F
 
GK

and F
 
GNnK

is neither ? nor N . Now assume that for some K  N with
#K = k, we have F
 
GK

= K and F
 
GNnK

= N n K. We will show that for
some K 0  N with #K 0 = k + 1, we have F

GK
0

= K 0 and F

GNnK
0

= N nK 0.
Let K 0 = K [ fig for some i =2 K. As for all K  N with K 6= ? and K 6= N , we
have F
 
GK
 2 fK;N nKg, suppose for the sake of contradiction that F GK0 =
N nK 0. Consider the prole GNnK . We have F  GNnK n fig = F GK0 n fig and
i 2 GK0j () i 2 GNnKj for all j 2 N but we have i 2 F
 
GNnK

and i =2 F

GK
0

which establishes the desired contradiction with I-KR. A similar argument shows that
F

GNnK
0

= N nK 0.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Suppose for a contradiction, there is a prole G 2  
such that for some i 2 N , we have i 2 Gj for all j 2 N but i =2 F (G) or i =2 Gj
for all j 2 N but i 2 F (G). Assume rst case. Let K = F (G) [ fig, by lemma
3.1, we have F
 
GK

= K = F (G) [ fig. Note that F  GK n fig = F (G) n fig
and i 2 Gj () i 2 GKj for all j 2 N but i 2 F
 
GK

and i =2 F (G) violating
independence. A similar argument shows non-existence of a prole for any i 2 N such
that i =2 Gj for all j 2 N but i 2 F (G).
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Let take any CIF F 2 F satisfying SYM-KR, I-KR and
L and any GP ;HP 2   dened for some 4-partition P = (P1; P2; P3; P4) of N . By
theorem 3.1, we have P1 [P2  F
 
GP
  P1 [P2 [P3 and P1  F  HP   P1 [P2.
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Moreover, by SYM, we have either F
 
GP

= P1 [ P2 or F
 
GP

= P1 [ P2 [ P3
and either F
 
HP

= P1 or F
 
HP

= P1 [ P2. Now suppose for a contradiction
that F
 
GP

= P1 [ P2 [ P3 where P3 6= ?. Let i 2 P3:Consider the prole G0 2  
with G0k = P1 [ P2 [ P3 n fig for all k 2 P1 [ P3 n fig, G0k = N for all k 2 P2 and
G0k = N nfkg for all k 2 P4[fig. From theorem 3.1, we have P1[P2[P3nfig  F (G0)
and for any j 2 P4, we have i and j are symmetric in G0, hence by SYM, we have either
F (G0) = P1[P2[P3nfig or F (G0) = N . But F (G0) = N violates L as i =2 Gi. Hence
F (G0) = P1[P2[P3nfig. But note that F (G0)nfig = F
 
GP
nfig and for all j 2 N ,
we have i 2 G0j () i 2 GPj hence by I we must have i 2 F
 
GP
 () i 2 F (G0)
which is not the case.
Now suppose for a contradiction that F
 
HP

= P1 where P2 6= ?. Let i 2 P2
and consider the prole H 0 2   such that H 0k = fkg for all k 2 P1 [ fig, H 0k =
P1 [ fig for all k 2 P2 [ P4 n fig and H 0k = ? for all k 2 P3. From theorem 3.1,
we have (P2 [ P3 [ P4 n fig) \ F (H 0) = ? and we have either P1 [ fig  F (H 0) or
(P1 [ fig) \ F (H 0) = ? from SYM since for any j 2 P1 and i are symmetric in the
prole H 0. Thus we have either F (H 0) = ? or F (H 0) = P1[fig. F (H 0) = ? violates
L since i 2 Gi. But F (H 0) = P1 [ fig violates I since F
 
HP
 n fig = F (H 0) n fig
and i 2 H 0j () i 2 HPj for all j 2 N , we have i 2 F (H 0) but i =2 F
 
HP

.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Clearly the Liberal CIF satises all three axioms. To
see the converse, take any CIF F 2 F which satises SYM, I and L. Suppose for a
contradiction that there exists a prole G 2   and an individuals i 2 N such that
i =2 Gi but i 2 F (G) or
i 2 Gi but i =2 F (G).
Consider the rst case. Let (M0;M1; N0; N1) be a 4-partition of N n fig such that
M0 = fj 2 F (G) n fig : i =2 Gjg
M1 = fj 2 F (G) n fig : i 2 Gjg
N0 = fj =2 F (G) [ fig : i =2 Gjg
N0 = fj =2 F (G) [ fig : i 2 Gjg.
Consider the prole G0 2   dened for each individual j 2 N as follows:
G0j =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
M0 [M1
M0 [M1 [N0 [ fig
M0 [M1
M0 [M1 [N0 [ fig
if k 2M0,
if k 2M1,
if k 2 N0 [ fig ,
if k 2 N1.
.
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Note thatG0 = GP whereGP is the prole dened for 4-partition P = (M0;M1; N0 [ fig ; N1)
of N as in the lemma 3.2, hence we have F (G0) = M0 [M1 = F (G) n fig. But I is
violated since F (G0) n fig = F (G) n fig and i 2 G0j () i 2 Gj for all j 2 N but we
have i 2 F (G) whereas i =2 F (G0).
Now consider the second case where i 2 Gi but i =2 F (G). Dene H 0 2   dened
for each individual j 2 N as follows:
H 0j =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
M0
M0 [M1 [ fig
M0 [M1
M0 [M1 [ fig
if k 2M0,
if k 2M1 [ fig ,
if k 2 N0,
if k 2 N1.
.
Note thatH 0 = HP whereHP is the prole dened for 4-partition P = (M0;M1 [ fig ; N0; N1)
of N as in the lemma 3.2, hence we have F (H 0) =M0 [M1 [ fig = F (G)[ fig. But
I is violated since F (H 0) n fig = F (G) n fig and i 2 H 0j () i 2 Gj for all j 2 N
but we have i 2 F (H 0) whereas i =2 F (G).
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